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This dissertation investigates the economics of health behaviors.  It focuses on the 
ways health behaviors, specifically smoking and fertility, respond to economic factors 
such as price and income, as well as non-economic factors such as health-related 
knowledge and health policy.  The first chapter, “The effect of contraceptive 
knowledge on fertility: the roles of mass media and social networks,” explores the 
effect of contraceptive knowledge on fertility using an instrumental variables approach.  
It draws upon the “Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice of Contraception in Taiwan” 
(KAP) dataset and focuses on the period when Taiwanese family planning programs 
were in effect.  The results indicate that mass media and social networks play 
important roles in disseminating contraceptive knowledge.  This study finds that 
women transform their knowledge into behavior--that is, contraceptive knowledge 
reduces fertility, no matter which fertility metric is measured (life-time fertility or 
probability of giving birth).  The second chapter (coauthored with Donald Kenkel), 
“U.S. cigarette demand: 1944 – 2004,” uses data from 23 national cross-sectional 
surveys conducted by the Gallup Poll from 1944 through 2004 to investigate the 
changes in cigarette demand in the United States from the 1940s through 2004, 
individual and government attitudes toward smoking changed dramatically.  It 
estimate standard two-part models of cigarette demand as a function of demographics, 
income, and cigarette prices. The results show that from 1944 to 2004: the gender 
difference in smoking rates almost disappears; the black-white difference reverses; a 
strong gradient with schooling emerges; and the negative income elasticities 
 
strengthened in magnitude.  The third chapter, “WTO Entry, a New Cigarette Tax 
Scheme, and the Tobacco Market in Taiwan,” analyzes the impacts of Taiwan’s entry 
into the WTO, which was accompanied by a series of policy changes on both the 
supply and demand sides of the tobacco market.  It investigates the link between 
cigarette tax and price by imputing the tax pass-through rates, and confirms the 
hypothesis that free trade induces an increase in advertisements and the introduction of 
new brands and products.  Regarding smokers’ reactions to price changes, this study 
finds some evidence that smokers not only react to price changes, but also react to 
relative price changes by switching brands.  It also takes into account other scenarios 
accompanying the WTO entry that influence the brand choices. 
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 Introduction 
 Health behaviors or lifestyle factors have tended for decades to be regarded as the 
major determinants of premature mortality.  Healthy behaviors directly improve the 
overall public health of a nation while reducing the cost of health care systems.  
Public and private agencies have, accordingly, conducted interventions such as 
increasing taxes, providing health-risk knowledge, implementing restrictions, etc. as 
attempts to alter citizens’ unwanted behaviors and encourage their healthy behaviors.   
This dissertation investigates the economics of health behaviors.  It focuses on 
the ways health behaviors, specifically smoking and fertility, respond to economic 
factors such as price and income, as well as non-economic factors such as 
health-related knowledge and health policy. It also examines health behaviors across 
different socio-economic statuses.   
The first chapter, “The effect of contraceptive knowledge on fertility: the roles 
of mass media and social networks,” investigates the ways people respond to new 
health-related knowledge.  It focuses on the period when Taiwan’s family planning 
programs were in effect and examines the relationship between contraceptive 
knowledge and fertility.  The implementation of family planning programs is an 
example of providing information intended to change behaviors: information about 
contraceptive techniques is provided to women of childbearing age so that they will 
increase the practice of contraception and thus control fertility.  The chapter 
examines how individuals build their contraceptive knowledge from these programs; 
how socioeconomic characteristics, mass media exposure, and an individual's social 
network influence the forming of that contraceptive knowledge; and whether the 
obtained contraceptive knowledge reduces fertility.  
  The second chapter and third chapter focus smoking behavior in the U.S. and 
Taiwan.  The second chapter, “U.S. cigarette demand: 1944 – 2004,” investigates the 
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 changes in cigarette demand in the United States from the 1940s through 2004, 
individual and government attitudes toward smoking changed dramatically.  It 
examines the changing influences of smoking determinants on smoking behaviors 
over time.  Because the data cover a long time span, we are able to study cigarette 
demand before and during the early years of tobacco control efforts, as well as during 
the most recent period.  
The third chapter is “WTO entry, new cigarette tax scheme, and the tobacco 
market in Taiwan”.  This study analyzes the impacts of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO 
in 2002 and the accompanying policy changes, on both the supply (cigarettes 
producers) and demand sides (cigarettes consumers) of the market.  In particular, it 
studies the tax pass-through rates for each individual brand and product.  It 
investigates the non-price competition of tobacco companies reflected in new 
introduced products and brands, and marketing promotion as well.  Finally, it studies 
smokers’ reactions to price changes in terms of brand switching.     
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 CHAPTER 1: THE EFFECT OF CONTRACEPTIVE KNOWLEDGE ON 
FERTERTILITY: THE ROLES OF MASS MEDIA AND SOCIAL NETWORKS 
 
Abstract 
This study explores the effect of contraceptive knowledge on fertility using an 
instrumental variables approach. It draws upon the “Knowledge, Attitudes, and 
Practice of Contraception in Taiwan” (KAP) dataset and focuses on the period when 
Taiwanese family planning programs were in effect. This study differs from previous 
studies examining the effectiveness of family planning programs on fertility by 
focusing on individuals’ obtained contraceptive knowledge and fertility. The results 
indicate that mass media and social networks play important roles in disseminating 
contraceptive knowledge. Women who are regularly exposed to mass media, or who 
have a wider social network, have more knowledge about contraceptives than their 
counterparts. This study finds that women transform their knowledge into 
behavior--that is, contraceptive knowledge reduces fertility, no matter which fertility 
metric is measured (life-time fertility or probability of giving birth). Since very few 
studies focus on the relationship between contraceptive knowledge and fertility, by 
exploring this relationship, this paper contributes to an improved understanding of 
how the individuals obtain the disseminated knowledge; how socioeconomic 
characteristics, mass media exposure, and social network influence the forming of 
knowledge; and whether the obtained knowledge is transformed into new behaviors.  
 
Introduction 
Many advertising campaigns sponsored by private or public agencies 
disseminate health, nutrition, and product information aimed at changing people’s 
behaviors.  Such information about issues reaches its goal only if individuals obtain 
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 the disseminated information and transform the acquired information into new 
behaviors.  This study focuses on the period when Taiwan’s family planning 
programs were in effect and examines the relationship between contraceptive 
knowledge and fertility.  It examines how the individuals build their contraceptive 
knowledge from the programs; how socioeconomic characteristics, mass media 
exposure, and social network influence the forming of that contraceptive knowledge; 
and whether the obtained contraceptive knowledge reduces fertility.  
The implementation of family planning programs is an example of providing 
information intended to change behaviors: information about contraceptive techniques 
is provided to women of childbearing age so that they will increase the practice of 
contraception and thus control fertility.  The ultimate aim is to couple low birth rates 
with a consistently low mortality rate to reduce population growth.  For developing 
countries where the population transitions from a combination of high mortality rate 
and high birth rate to a combination of low mortality rate and high birth rate, the 
resulting rapid population growth may create pressures on housing, education, and 
social patterns.  Such a situation often dramatically increases the financial burden of 
the nation as a whole.  In order to control population growth by reducing fertility 
rates, governments may opt to implement family planning programs which provide 
married couples with information about modern contraceptive techniques, 
contraceptive access, and the benefits of having fewer children.  In some societies, 
such programs may also aim to overcome entrenched gender preference toward sons.  
Several studies have focused on investigating whether such family planning 
programs play any role in decreasing fertility, or whether the decrease is actually 
driven by economic and social changes; for example, improved educational and 
economic opportunities for women might cause them to desire fewer children.1  
                                                 
1 A few studies address this issue. For example, Pritchett (1994) and Gertler and Molyneaux (1994).  
4 
 However, the endogenous characteristics of the input-allocation of family planning 
programs – high fertility villages tend to be the target of family planning programs and 
hence receive more family planning inputs than other areas – make the evaluation of 
the causal effect of family planning programs challenging2.  
This study differs from previous studies examining the effectiveness of family 
planning programs on fertility by focusing on individuals’ obtained contraceptive 
knowledge and fertility.  This study examines the factors related to the acquisition of 
contraceptive knowledge, and the relationship between an individual’s contraceptive 
knowledge and their fertility during the period when family planning programs were 
enacted.  Since dissemination of information relating to modern contraceptive 
techniques is one of the main ways for family planning programs to control fertility, 
examining the ways married women obtain contraceptive knowledge from the 
programs; the differences in knowledge acquisition across different demographic, 
social, and economic clines; and the subsequent effects on fertility sheds new light on 
the effectiveness of family planning programs, as well as the relationship between 
contraceptive knowledge and fertility.   
Taiwan’s family planning programs, enacted nationwide in 1964, aimed to 
decrease the fertility rate in order to control population growth. To reach this goal, the 
programs educated citizens about population growth issues, extolled the benefits of 
smaller families, and valuing daughters as highly as sons. These aim at changing 
married couples’ traditional values about family.  In addition, the program provided 
information about accessing and using contraceptive techniques. In Taiwan in the 
1960s, primary education was not universal and both public transportation and 
                                                 
2 There are a few of randomly designed family planning programs, such as the Taichung city experiment 
conducted in 1963, the Matlab family planning program, and the family planning programs 
PROFAMILIA of Colombia (Sinha, 2005).  
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 communication technologies were limited;3 the family planning program therefore 
used a variety of information dispersal techniques, including visiting families, placing 
advertisements/announcements in mass media, and encouraging word-of-mouth 
communication via friends, relatives, or neighbors to disseminate the information on 
family planning programs. For example, the information about modern contraceptive 
techniques, modern contraceptive access, and the benefits of having fewer children.  
Previous literature (for example, Kan and Tsai, 2004; Aggarwal and Rous, 2006; 
Barber and Axinn, 2004; Montgomery and Casterline, 1993; Behrman et al., 2002) 
have found that mass media exposure and word-of-mouth communication play 
important roles in obtaining the disseminated information in developing countries such 
as Taiwan, Nepal, India, and Kenya.   
The detailed information on women’s contraceptive knowledge, fertility history, 
mass media exposure, women’s organization participation, and household and 
demographic characteristics in the “Knowledge, Attitude and Practice of 
Contraception in Taiwan” data sets allow researchers to measure directly women’s 
contraceptive knowledge; contraceptive knowledge across socioeconomic 
characteristics, mass media exposure, and social networks; and the outcomes on 
fertility.  
However, the obtained contraceptive knowledge is jointly determined by 
factors related to the demand- and supply-side of contraceptive knowledge.  
Unobserved factors, such as a couple’s modernization and their sex/ parity/ quantity 
preference toward children, determine the levels of demand for both fertility and 
contraceptive knowledge.  The existence of unobserved factors makes identification 
of causality challenging.  This study uses an instrumental variables approach to 
                                                 
3 In 1964, around 22% of the population did not have primary education, 3.9 per thousand households 
had the motor transportations, and 11.6 per thousand households had a telephone set in Taiwan. (Source: 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book)  
6 
 resolve the endogeneity issue.  Mass media exposure and connection to social 
networks are treated as instrumental variables of contraceptive knowledge to examine 
the causal effect of contraceptive knowledge on fertility.     
There have been several studies investigating the relationship between 
knowledge and behaviors applied to different fields of interest, such as product 
consumption, risky behaviors, and health outcomes.  Very few studies, however, 
focus on the relationship between contraceptive knowledge and fertility4.  By 
exploring this relationship, this paper contributes to an improved understanding of the 
relationship between knowledge and behavior. 
 
Taiwan’s Family Planning Programs 
Taiwan’s death rate fell from about 14 to 5 per thousand between 1948 and 
1962, while the fertility rate remained unchanged.  High fertility rates and low death 
rates led to an annual rate of population growth that reached 3.5% in the years between 
1951 and 1956.  The 3.5% growth rate caused the population to double in only 20 
years (Freedman and Takeshita, 1969).  Although it is possible for social and 
economic development to change the role of the traditional family and decrease the 
demand for children, it usually takes years to complete the transition from high 
mortality and fertility to low mortality and fertility.  Therefore, Taiwan’s family 
planning programs were implemented nationwide to slow down population growth 
and shorten the period of demographic transition to prevent a large population growth 
that might impede economic development.  
Taiwan’s family planning programs were enacted nationwide in 1964. Before 
1964, there were some voluntary and quasi-governmental activities advocating family 
                                                 
4 Goldin and Katz (2002), Bailey(2006), Ananat et al (2007) use access to, rather than knowledge of, 
contraceptive techniques to analyze its effect on age of first marriage, professional career, and life-time 
fertility.   
7 
 planning.  For example, in 1950 the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction 
(JCRR) issued one million copies of the pamphlet, “The Happy Family,” advocating 
family planning by the rhythm method. In 1954, the China Family Planning 
Association, a voluntary organization subsidized by the JCRR, organized a training 
program emphasizing birth control and child spacing for women living in the 
dependent villages (Freedman et al., 1994). 
Around 1963 and 1964, there was an experimental study in the city of 
Taichung to test the effectiveness of a more intensive family planning program.  This 
study established that many families were interested in family planning and that 
couples in all social strata would accept contraceptive techniques when they were 
offered.  The success of the program provided support for a later nationwide family 
intervention.  In 1964, the government started a nationwide five-year plan, with a 
grant of US $24 million, to reduce the fertility rate by persuading 600,000 women to 
use contraceptives for their family planning needs.  
The program involved 300 female health workers who made motivational and 
educational visits to women of childbearing age in their homes to offer subsidized 
contraceptives (Freedman et al., 1994).  Since the number of pre-pregnancy health 
workers was limited, they concentrated first on visiting families with more than three 
children, those with sons, those living in high-fertility counties, the poor, and those 
living in remote villages.  The reason was that these women had a stronger 
motivation to accept contraception, and their higher acceptance rates would most 
effectively lower the overall fertility rate.  
The family planning program also used public media, such as radio, TV, 
newspapers, and slides at Taiwan’s movie houses to explain contraceptive techniques 
and how to obtain contraceptives.  Articles on family planning were clipped out 
every month from 15 of Taiwan’s 22 newspapers.  In 1965 there were a total of 319 
8 
 articles related to family planning (Chu, 1966).  In addition, around 50,000 posters 
were printed and placed in villages around the island. Mass media and word-of-mouth 
communication are the main ways to disseminate the contraceptive information. Over 
60% of married women indicate they obtained the information about family planning 
from mass media or friends/ relatives/neighbors5.  
The government also used financial incentives to encourage women to use 
contraception.  When new kinds of contraceptive techniques were introduced, the 
government updated their method of subsidizing contraceptives.  The government 
first encouraged using loop and subsidized half of the cost; then they started to 
encourage using contraceptive pills and condoms and subsidized part of the cost.  In 
addition to the government’s subsidization of sterilization surgery for the poor, each 
city government also used welfare funding to subsidize sterilization surgery for the 
general population (Freedman et al., 1994).  The number of people undergoing 
surgical sterilization rose rapidly. The family planning programs were officially ended 
in 1985. 
 
Literature Review 
There have been several studies investigating the relationship between 
knowledge and behaviors that have focused on different fields of interest, such as 
consumption and health-related behaviors.  Some studies measure an individual’s 
information acquisition about issues and examine the individual's subsequent behavior 
according to different information acquisition (for example, Kenkel, 1991; Kan and 
Tsai, 2004; Nayga, 2000); others focus on an event shock, such as the removal of the 
ban on nutrition claims on product and advertising style campaigns, to identify the 
information effect to examine different reactions among different subgroups toward 
                                                 
5 From KAP data sets.  
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 the new information (for example, de Walque, 2004; Ippolito and Mathios, 1999).  
Regarding the literature about factors related to fertility, there is a large body of 
literature, covering several different countries, investigating the relationship between 
contraception and fertility.  Most of this literature focuses on contraceptive access 
rather than knowledge.  Several studies focus on family planning programs in the 
developing countries.  They use the time and location variation among family 
planning programs as inputs to investigate the effect of contraception access on 
fertility (for example, Miller, 2008).  A few studies focus on fertility in the U.S.; they 
use abortion legalization and pharmaceutical regulations, which vary states and over 
time, to examine the effect of contraception accessibility on fertility related outcomes 
(Goldin and Katz, 2002; Bailey 2006, Ananat et al, 2007)).  These studies 
demonstrate that women who have access to contraception at an early age have fewer 
births and better career achievement than those without such access.  
In addition, a large body of literature has focused on the individual's decision 
to use (or not to use) contraception and their choice of contraception types focusing on 
institutional and social factors influencing the decisions.  Institutional factors shape 
the accessibility and availability of contraceptives which directly influence the use and 
choice of contraception (Braunder-Otto et al. 2007).  Social effects, on the other hand, 
influence contraceptive adoption through defining it as a social acceptable behavior, 
and by spreading the information and adoption of new behaviors (Montgomery and 
Casterline, 1993; Behrman et al., 2002; Edmeades, 2008).  Institutional effects and 
social effects may jointly influence the adoption of new behaviors.  Institutional 
effects may indirectly influence the new behavior by establishing a social and 
economic environment which relates to the diffusion and adoption of new behaviors 
(Edmeades, 2008).  
This study argues that the process of establishing contraceptive knowledge is 
10 
 similar to the process of decision making about contraceptives.  The institutional 
effects and social effects influence the dissemination of contraceptive knowledge in 
the same way that they influence contraceptive practice and choice.  The mass media 
campaigns/ advertisements sponsored by family planning programs could be seen as 
an institutional effect because they indirectly influence women’s awareness of modern 
contraceptives, not only by spreading information about contraceptive methods, but 
also by identifying locations for obtaining contraceptives.  These campaigns can also 
be seen as social effects, as they shape contraception as a social acceptable behavior.  
Social networks, through which the contraceptive knowledge spread, are another 
method by which a social effect influences the establishment of contraceptive 
knowledge and multiplies the effect of mass media on the build of contraceptive 
knowledge. Several studies focus on factors such as mass media and social networks, 
associating them with the establishment of health-related information (Kan and Tsai 
(2004); Aggarwal and Rous (2006); Barber and Axinn (2004); Montgomery and 
Casterline (1993); Behrman et al. (2002)).   
This study adds to the existing literature by examining the effect of 
contraceptive knowledge obtained from several mechanisms, such as mass media and 
social networks, on fertility.  
 
Data 
This research is primarily based on data from five island-wide surveys, 
“Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice of Contraception in Taiwan” (KAP).  They are 
repeated cross-sectional data conducted respectively in 1965, 1967, 1976, 1980, and 
1985.6  These surveys interviewed married women of reproductive age (18-44). The 
                                                 
6 I do not include KAP 3 data collected in 1970, because the nature of KAP 3 is different from the other 
sets of KAP. KAP 3 re-interviewed half of the respondents interviewed in 1967, while the other half of 
the data is from an independent sample in the 22-39 age group.   
11 
 data set includes information about women’s fertility history, desired number of 
children, and attitudes toward, knowledge of, and use of contraception.  In addition, 
measures of socio-economic status and demographic information such as age, 
education, employment, and family history for both wives and husbands are covered.  
Table 1-1 presents the summary statistics for each survey year.  In 1965, the 
year after the nation wide implementation of family planning programs, the women in 
fertile ages have had 4.04 live births on average.  In 1967, two years after, the 
average number of live births drops to 3.96 and it keeps dropping to 2.66 live births in 
1985.  On the other hand, contraceptive knowledge among married women of fertile 
age is expanding over time.  In 1965, married women know about 3.5 modern 
contraceptive techniques on average; in 1967, married women know about 4 modern 
contraceptive techniques, and in 1980s, married women know about 8 modern 
contraceptive techniques.  Figure 1 presents the prevalence of knowledge of the 
selected modern contraceptive techniques for married women in every survey year.  
It shows that the prevalence of each specific technique might reflect the target of 
contraception that family planning programs emphasize.  For example, the family 
planning programs first encouraged practicing loop, ota ring, and tubal ligation; later 
on, the programs encouraged women to use condoms and oral pills.  The data in 
Figure 1 is consistent with that pattern.  Furthermore, the practices of contraception 
and abortion have been increasing (Table 1-1). In 1965, only 27% of married women 
ever practiced contraception; however, in 1985, 88% of them ever practiced 
contraception. In 1965, only 10% of married women had ever had an abortion; in 1985, 
28% of them had had one or more abortion.   
 
Table 1-1: Summary Statistics 
 KAP 1
(1965) 
KAP 2 
(1967) 
KAP 4 
(1976) 
KAP 5  
(1980) 
KAP 6 
(1985) 
Sample size 3,719 4,989 5,587 3,852 3,819 
12 
 Table 1-1 (continued) 
Dependent variable      
Number of living births 4.04 3.96 3.20 2.70 2.66 
Ideal number of births 3.96 3.89 3.25 2.84 2.57 
Abortion 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.23 0.28 
Number of abortion 1.57 1.60 1.57 1.60 1.54 
Number of contraceptive techniques known 3.5 4.00 6.15 8.05 7.97 
Contraception practice 0.27 0.41 0.68 0.83 0.88 
Independent variable      
Whether the respondent reads the newspaper 
often 
0.14 0.21 0.29 0.51 0.62 
Whether the respondent reads magazines often   0.11 0.16 0.22 
Whether the respondent listens to the radio 
often 
 0.54 0.15 0.27 0.49 
Whether the respondent watches the TV often  0.21 0.70 0.79 0.93 
Does the respondent own a Radio 0.55     
Whether living with other married couples 0.27 0.28 0.16 0.10 0.11 
Organization participation   0.15 0.06 0.06 
No son 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.18 
Women’s Education level      
Illiterate 0.49 0.40 0.25 0.12 0.08 
Elementary 0.41 0.49 0.59 0.58 0.48 
Junior high 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.17 
Senior high 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.21 
College 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.06 
Husband’s years of schooling 5.78 6.19 7.32 8.60 9.26 
Whether working outside of family 0.17 0.20 0.44 0.31 0.33 
Whether living with parents or parent’s in law 0.52 0.46 0.39 0.38 0.40 
Women’s age 31.95 32.15 33.49 30.70 32.20 
Living in city dummy 0.30 0.31 0.43 0.47 0.50 
Sample size 3,719 4,989 5,587 3,852 4,312 
Husband’s ethnicity (Fukiennese)  0.76 0.73 0.68 0.72 0.73 
            (Hakka) 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.14 
            (Mainlander)  0.09 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.09 
Contraceptive Knowledge      
Know Condom 0.29 0.30 0.54 0.85 0.89 
Know Foam Tablets 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.36 0.24 
Know Jelly 0.17 0.15 0.23 0.35 0.26 
Know Diaphragm 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.35 0.38 
Know Rhythm 0.20 0.27 0.45 0.60 0.67 
Know Basic Temperature  0.05 0.09 0.20 0.43 0.53 
Know Coitus Interruption 0.04 0.08 0.24 0.45 0.50 
Know Ota Ring  0.64 0.61 0.76 0.87 0.75 
Know Loop 0.47 0.62 0.89 0.96 0.92 
Know Oral Pill 0.31 0.47 0.85 0.93 0.93 
Know Vasectomy 0.33 0.35 0.65 0.93 0.93 
Know Tubal Ligation 0.61 0.63 0.83 0.96 0.96 
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Figure 1: The Prevalence of Contraceptive Knowledge 1965, 1967, 1976, 1980, 1985
 
The increasing trends of mass media exposure, women’s education levels, 
urban residence, and women’s working status also reflect the rapid social chang
economic development of Taiwan during the 1960s-1980s.  More and more wom
were regularly exposed to radio, TV, newspapers, and magazines over time.  
Women’s education levels and working status also increased.     
 
Identification Strategy 
The direction of causati
 
 
es and 
en 
on between contraceptive knowledge and fertility 
behavio ; 
hoosing 
to 
rs is a concern.  One possibility is that contraception choices affect fertility
women who have larger contraceptive knowledge are more resourceful in c
among different kinds of contraceptive techniques and practice the contraception 
control their fertility.  Another possibility is that fertility affects the acquisition of 
contraceptive knowledge.  Women who have reached their desired number of 
14 
 children, or have achieved their desired gender ratio among their children, have 
incentives to seek out more contraceptive knowledge than those who have not.  
Finally, external factors may determine levels of both fertility and contraceptive 
knowledge. For example, women who are more “modern” and “westernized” are mo
open to and resourceful with modern contraceptive techniques, and they at the sa
time demand fewer children.  
Therefore, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model without correcting the 
endogeneity in contraceptive knowledge, does not gauge the true effect of 
contraceptive knowled
re 
me 
ge on fertility.  This study uses an instrumental variables 
pproach to overcome the endogeneity issue, using mass media exposure and women’s 
participation in organizations as th ntraceptive knowledge.  The 
 
a 
h 
y 
 
tion.  Section 7 explains in detail the strength and validity of 
these ins
 
ssue, 
a
e instruments of co
hypotheses are: 1) married women who regularly listen to the radio, watch TV, read 
magazines, or read newspapers have more access to contraceptive advertisements and
family planning campaigns, and hence, obtain more contraceptive information; 2) 
married women who actively participate in community-based organizations have 
wider social network, and hence, obtain more contraceptive knowledge throug
word-of-mouth communications.  The instruments are believed to influence fertilit
only through contraceptive knowledge; that is, they are uncorrelated with the error
term in fertility equa
truments.   
Life-time Fertility 
 First, I used the OLS model, which does not take into account endogeneity i
to estimate the life-time fertility equation (1) to investigate the relationship between 
contraceptive knowledge and fertility. iN  refers to the number of live births by the 
woman i; iK  is the number of contraceptive techniques the woman i has heard of; 
15 
 iX  refers to other variables influencing fertility, such as the woman’s age cohort,
education, husband’s education, husband’s income, husband’s ancestry, her current 
working status, urban/rural residence, cohabitation with parents-in-law, and other 
factors.  
 
iiii XKN εβββ +++= 210         (1) 
Second, I take into account the endogeneity of contraceptive knowledge. In 
order to overcome the endogeneity issue, I use the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
pproach: first, I use mass media exposure and organization participation as the 
instruments to identify the  in equation (2), and then 
I use th  
 
ve 
-of-mouth communication). 
a
effect of contraceptive knowledge
e predicted value of contraceptive knowledge from (2) to estimate the effect of
contraceptive knowledge in the fertility equation (3). The variables indicating whether
the respondents regularly watch TV, listen to the radio, read newspapers, or read 
magazines are proxies for exposure to the fertility-related campaigns and contracepti
advertisements in the mass media. The variables indicating whether they participate in 
community organizations are proxies for exposure to contraceptive knowledge through 
social networks (word
iiiiiiii XIVIVIVIVIVK νγγγγγγγ +++++++= 6543210 54321    (2) 
iiii XK εβββ +++= 210 ˆ    (3) 
The Probability of Giving Birth 
The number of live births is recorded from the year of marriage to the current 
year, while contraceptive knowledge, women’s working status, urban/rural res
and cohabitation with parents-in-law, and the measures of mass media exposure an
social network are measured in the current year.  To ensure the exa
N
 
idence, 
d 
mination of the 
causal effect of knowledge on fertility, all variables are measured in the current state.  
I use linear probability model to examine the likelihood of giving birth in the previous 
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 year in equation (4)7. 
)()Pr( ,4,13,12,10,1 iititititit XBoyNKGB εβββββ +++++= −−−  (4) 
itB ,1−  is a binary variable indicate whether the married women had a live birth last 
year; itK ,  is the current contraceptive knowledge; itN ,1−  is the number of live 
births until the last year; itBoy ,1− is the number of boy births until the last year; itX ,  
refers to other variables influencing fertility, such as the woman’s age cohort, 
education, husband’s education, husband’s income, husband’s ancestry, her current 
working status, urban/rural residence, cohabitation with parents-in-law, and other 
factors.  OLS model without correcting the endogeneity issue is first est
In addition, I take into account th neity of contraceptive knowledge 
and use the 2SLS approach.  I first use mass media exposure and organization 
participation as the instruments to ident fect of contraceptive knowledge in 
equation (5), and then I use th ptive knowledge from (5) to 
estimat  
ing 
imated.  
e endoge
ify the ef
e predicted value of contrace
e the effect of contraceptive knowledge in the fertility equation (6).  I used the
same set of instrumental variables as the total number of live birth equation indicat
whether the respondents regularly exposed to mass media and their connections to 
social networks. 
iiiiiiii XIVIVIVIVIVK νγγγγγγγ +++++++= 6543210 54321    (5) 
)ˆ()Pr( 3,12,10,1 tititit BoyNKGB ββββ +++= −− ,4,1 iiti X εβ ++−    (6) 
 
 
Results 
Life-time Fertility Equation 
Table 1-2 presents the regression results of the number of live births estimated
with OLS.  The regressions are estimated separately by each survey year. Wife’s 
                                                 
 This study examines the birth probability in the previous year instead of the current year, because it 
ensures the duration of each possible event occurs is one year and it can be consistent in each survey 
7
year.   
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 education level and current working status, which could serve as proxies for prices
having children, are negatively associated with the number of live births.  Husband’s 
education is negatively correlated with number of live births.  Husband’s income is 
not statistically associated with the number of births.  
Older women have more live births than younger ones. Husband’s ancestry is 
associated with the number of live births.  Compared with the Fukiennese, the 
Mainlanders have fewer live births.  Women who live in the city have fewer births. 
The OLS model indicates that contraceptive knowledge is positively associated wit
the number of live births in the earlier survey years: 1965, 1967, and 1976.  The 
magnitude of this association decreases with time.  The sign of coefficient on 
contraceptive knowledge changes to negative in the later survey years: 1980 and 1985. 
The positive relationship between contraceptive knowledge and life time fertili
 of 
 
h 
 
ty 
contrad ition that contraception prevents unintended births, since it does not 
e positive relationship explains a 
rce of endog ivin  posit
le, w g ber o ren a  target 
ly planning programs m rce he s, such as 
sits from health personnel, tele ont  ab on e 
 The decreasin nitud ositiv et effects explains that the 
ect has been vanishing over tim lanat r the positive 
ip is the reverse ca y betw ontra e kno e and lity: 
ho have had a larg ber of births might have mo entive eek out 
echn  th to re   
 
 liv hs, O  
OLS: d ari er hs 
icts the intu
take into account the endogeneity issue.  Indeed, th
possible sou eneity: there might arget  drbe a t effect g the ive 
relationship. For examp
 fami
omen with a very lar e num f child re the
of  and get ore resou s from t program
family vi phone c acts, etc out the c traceptiv
knowledge. g mag e of p e targ
target eff e.  Another exp ion fo
relationsh usalit een c ceptiv wledg  ferti
women w e num re inc s to s
effective contraceptive t iques on eir own prevent p gnancy.     
Table 1-2: The number of e birt LS model  
ependant v able: numb of live birt  
  1965 1967 1976 1980 1985
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 Table 1-2 (continued) 
n 
Number of contraceptives 
know
0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  [0.01]** * * [0.01]* [0.01]* [0.01]* [0.01]+ 
No son  -1.49 -1.64 -1.15 -0.97 -0.90 
 [0.10]** [0.09]** [0.06]** [0.06]** [0.05]** 
age1822 -3.95 -3.75 0.00 -1.97 -1.78 
  [0.14]** * *  [0.11]* [0.00] [0.11]* [0.08]**
age2327 -3.27 -3.13 -2.20 -1.44 -1.31 
  [0.14]** [0.09]** [0.07]** [0.08]** [0.07]** 
age2832 -2.06 -2.09 -1.45 -0.80 -0.81 
  [0.11]**    [0.08]** [0.05]** [0.08]** [0.06]**
age3337 -0.83 -1.01 -0.64 -0.24 -0.37 
  [0.10]**    [0.09]** [0.04]** [0.08]** [0.05]**
Wife is working outside of 
family 
-0.25 -0.17 -0.15 -0.12 -0.21 
  [0.07]** * * * * [0.07]* [0.04]* [0.04]* [0.04]*
Wife years education 12 and 
er ov
-0.61 -0.74 -0.58 -0.47 -0.46 
  [0.14]** *    [0.12]* [0.07]** [0.04]** [0.05]**
Wife years education 0-6 0.29 0.36 0.37 0.24 0.03 
  [0.07]** [0.06]** [0.05]** [0.06]** [0.10] 
Husband years education 0-6 0.30 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.21 
  ** [0.06]** [0.12]+ [0.07]** [0.06]+ [0.06]
Husband years education 12 
and o
-0.42 -0.20 -0.30 -0.28 -0.25 
ver 
  [0.07]** [0.08]* [0.05]** [0.04]** [0.05]** 
Husband’s ancestry: hakka 0.00 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 -0.14 
  [0.09] [0.09] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06]* 
Husband’s ancestry: -0.56 -0.43 -0.14 -0.19 -0.33 
mainlander 
  [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.06]* [0.05]** [0.07]** 
Live in a city -0.66 -0.22 -0.20 -0.20 -0.22 
  [0.16]** [0.10]* [0.07]** [0.07]** [0.05]** 
Live with parents-in-law -0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 
  [0.06] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] 
Husband’s income  -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 
   [0.04] [0.01] [0.04] [0.03] 
Constant 6.11 6.38 4.60 3.76 4.03 
  [0.13]** [0.22]** [0.06]** [0.10]** [0.11]** 
Observations 3662 4871 4678 3852 3817 
R-squared 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.46 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
In order to resolve the endogeneity issue, a 2SLS model which takes into account 
endogeneity is estimated. Table 1-3 and 1-4 present the results.  The result of the first 
19 
 stage is listed in Table 1-3, and the second stage in Table 1-4.  The result in Table 1-3 
dicates that women who are regularly exposed to mass media, including watching 
 newspapers have larger 
ntraceptive k
tions have greater co ve ge ir n rticip
The instruments explain contraceptive knowledge very well.  F 
.  All F statistics are above 10, su ng the shold 
enta ables8 e first icates that m edia 
 in g c tiv ledg
ith the findings of previous literature.  
r of live 2SL  sta
 stage:  o pti ues
in
TV, listening to the radio, reading magazines, or reading
co nowledge than thos o do n omen e wh ot; w who participate in 
organiza ntracepti  knowled  than the on-pa ating 
counterparts.  The
statistics are 26.92, 65.50, 46.06, 14.60, and 29.75 in 1965, 1967, 1976, 1980, and 
1985 respectively rpassi  thre of 
powerfulness for instrum l vari .  Th  stage ind ass m
and social networks play crucial roles obtainin ontracep e know e, 
consistent w
 
Table 1-3: The numbe  births, 
mber
S (first ge) 
2SLS: first  dv: nu f contrace ve techniq  known 
  1965 1967 1976  1980 1985
No son -0.89 -0.84 -0.61 -0.00 -0.11 
 [0.13]** [0.12]** **   [0.12] [0.12] [0.10]
age1822 -0.66 -0.91 0.00 -0.65 0.11 
  [0.22]** [0.18]** [0.00] [0.31]* [0.19] 
age2327 -0.16 -0.34 -0.48 -0.12 0.62 
  [0.14] [0.13]**  [0.14]** [0.20] [0.15]**
age2832 0.43 0.24 -0.02 0.04 0.41 
  [0.10]**  [0.12]* [0.12] [0.19] [0.12]** 
age3337 0.41 0.36 0.28 0.18 0.20 
  [0.13]** * [0.12]** [0.09]* [0.16] [0.11]+ 
Wife is working outside of 
family 
0.00 0.25 0.16 0.07 0.25 
  [0.14] [0.11]* [0.13] [0.13] [0.09]* 
Wife’s education is 12 or above 1.08 0.86 0.84 0.89 1.03 
  [0.36]** [0.28]** [0.16]** [0.12]** [0.11]** 
Wife’s education is 0-6 -1.02 -0.80 -0.66 -0.77 -0.88 
  [0.12]** [0.11]** [0.11]** [0.18]** [0.23]** 
Husband’s education is 0-6 -0.31 -0.46 -0.46 -0.45 -0.91 
  [0.10]** *  * * [0.09]* [0.11]** [0.13]* [0.27]*
                                                 
8 Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that the instru s co ea tatistic 
an 10.  
ment set i nsidered w k if the first stage F s
is less th
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 Table 1-3 (continued) 
usband’s education is 12 or .28 0.98 H
above 
1 0.78 0.61 0.66 
  [0.21]** [0.17]**   [0.13]** [0.12]** [0.10]** 
Husband’s ancestry: hakka 0.68 0.26 0.95 0.03 0.32 
  [0.33]* [0.15]+ [0.33]** [0.26] [0.17]+ 
Husband’s ancestry: mainlander 0.17 0.24 0.33 -0.13 -0.44 
  [0.19] [0.16] [0.17]+ [0.15] [0.14]** 
Living in a city -0.14 0.62 0.54 0.04 0.80 
  [0.47] [0.18]** [0.37] [0.24] [0.29]** 
Living with parents in law -0.18 -0.26 -0.27 -0.01 0.07 
  9]** [0.08] [0.08] [0.09]+ [0.09]** [0.0
Listen to radio 0.36 0.82 0.51 0.21 0.30 
  * [0.10]** [0.09]** [0.13]** [0.11]+ [0.09]*
Read newspapers 1.88 1.59 1.17 0.83 1.07 
  [0.22]** [0.16]** [0.13]** [0.15]** [0.13]** 
Live with married couples 0.06 -0.13 -0.39 -0.08 -0.09 
  [0.11] [0.09] [0.16]* [0.13] [0.10] 
Husband’s income  0.49 0.09 0.38 0.24 
   [0.07]** [0.02]** [0.10]** [0.08]** 
Watch tv   0.72 0.83 0.29 -0.03 
   [0.13]** [0.12]** [0.13]* [0.15] 
Read magazines   0.89 0.84 0.54 
    [0.14]** [0.13]** [0.08]** 
Join organizations   0.49 0.42 0.52 
    [0.19]* [0.18]* [0.16]** 
Constant 4.47 2.19 1.86 6.27 6.33 
  [0.18]** [0.19]** [0.14]** [0.28]** [0.22]** 
F statistics 26.92 65.50 46.06 14.60 29.75
Observations 3662 4868 4678 3852 3819 
R-squared 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.31 0.35 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The results of the secon  A king 
tive to negative. itio rac ch ow men 
eases the total number  by 09 18 0 i 967, 
76, 1980, and 1985 respe  The price ef ferti tio tive-- 
en with high educa  cu or side of the fam  
  The income  th  e s p ut hes 
d e are l  in Table 1-4.  stag isted fter ta into 
account endogeneity, the signs of the coefficients on contraceptive knowledge change 
from posi  An add nal cont eptive te nique kn n by wo
decr  of births  0.16, 0. , 0.14, 0. , and 0.2 n 1965, 1
19 ctively. fect in lity equa n is nega
the wom tion and rrently w king out ily have
fewer births.  effect in e fertility quation i ositive b only reac
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 statistical significance in 19 e s o em c f  
ore live births.  
tha nne era
ber of live births, 2SLS (second stage) 
LS: ent var numbe e births
67.  Th influence f other d ographi actors on
fertility are similar with the findings in OLS. Older cohorts have m
Mainlanders have fewer live births n Fukie se on av ge.    
 
Table 1-4: The num
2S depend iable: r of liv  
  1965 1967 1976  9851980 1
Number of contraceptive 
techniques known 
-0.16 -0.09 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20 
  [0.05]** * *  * [0.03]* [0.03]* [0.03]** [0.03]*
No  son -1.68 -1.76 -1.24 -0.96 -0.92 
 [0.09]** * * * * [0.07]* [0.06]* [0.05]* [0.05]*
age1822 -4.10 -3.86 0.00 -2.06 -1.76 
  [0.14]** [0.12]** [0.00] [0.10]** [0.09]** 
age2327 -3.31 -3.16 -2.25 -1.46 -1.20 
  [0.09]** *    [0.07]* [0.06]** [0.06]** [0.06]**
age2832 -1.98 -2.04 -1.45 -0.79 -0.72 
  [0.08]** ** ** ** [0.07]** [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
age3337 -0.76 -0.96 -0.58 -0.22 -0.33 
  [0.08]** [0.07]** [0.05]** ** ** [0.06] [0.05]
Wife is working outside of .24 
family 
-0 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.18 
  [0.07]** [0.06]* [0.05]** [0.04]** [0.04]** 
W
ab
ife’s education 12 or 
ove 
-0.18 -0.55 -0.32 -0.25 -0.20 
  [0.19] [0.13]**    [0.09]** [0.08]** [0.07]**
Wife’s education 0-6 -0.03 0.15 0.20 0.06 -0.22 
  [0.10] [0.07]* [0.05]**  [0.06] [0.08]**
Husband’s education 0-6 0.22 0.04 0.11 0.18 0.02 
  [0.07]** [0.06] [0.06]+ [0.07]** [0.11] 
Husband’s education 12 or -0.00 0.01 -0.0
above 
8 -0.13 -0.08 
  [0.14] [0.09] [0.06] [0.06]* [0.05] 
Husband’s ancestry: hakka -0.08 -0.07 0.15 -0.10 0.09 
  [0.10] [0.08] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06] 
Husban
mainlander 
d’s ancestry: -0.52 -0.36 -0.06 -0.21 -0.41 
  [0.11]** [0.08]** [0.05] [0.06]** [0.07]** 
Living in a city -0.67 -0.12 -0.06 -0.17 -0.06 
  [0.11]** [0.10] [0.07] [0.06]** [0.07] 
Live with parents in law -0.12 -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.04 
  [0.06]+ [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] 
Husband’s income  0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 
   [0.04] [0.01]* [0.04] [0.03] 
Constant 7.25 6.79 5.01 4.81 5.32 
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 Table 1-4 (continued) 
  [0.37]** [0.21]** [0.20]** [0.29]** [0.28]** 
Observations 3662 4868 4678 3852 3817 
R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.40 0.36 
Over-identification test 
(p-value) 
0.4707 0.0826 0.1415 0.0307 0.0099 
Standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The Probability of Giving Birth 
This study estimates the probability of giving birth using OLS and 2SLS 
pproach.  The result of OLS is listed in Table 1-5.  The result indicates that 
lihood of giving birth in the 
ear, conditional upon the e birth has been given before
, except in 1967.  Those who had not had any sons before the previous 
y to  birth ear than the counterparts.  This is true in 
ey year.  The result implies that marri es’ ce ons is 
e younger cohorts have a higher probability of giving birth in the 
Women who are currently working outside of family 
 probability o bi  th  year en’ ion is 
rth lan  le to have 
pared ne
ty ving b  OLS l 
OL eth rt r 
a
contraceptive knowledge has almost no effect on the like
last y accumulative liv  the 
previous year
year yet are more likel  give last y
each surv ed coupl  preferen  toward s
still existent.  Th
previous year than older cohorts. 
have a lower f giving rth within e past .  Wom s educat
not associated with the likelihood of giving bi .  Main ders are ss likely 
births last year com to Fukien se.  
 
Table 1-5: The probabili  of gi irths,  mode
S: dv: wh er having bi hs last yea
  1965 967 1976 980 19851 1
Cumulative not having 
ns so
0.09 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.11 
 [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]**   [0.02]** [0.02]**
Total live births until last 
year 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** 
Number of contraceptive 
techniques known 
-0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  [0.00] [0.00]* [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]+ 
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 Table 1-5 (continued) 
age1822 0.41 0.43 0.00 0.20 0.26 
  [0.04]** * * * [0.04]* [0.00] [0.04]* [0.05]*
age2327 0.52 0.49 0.31 0.20 0.26 
  [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** 
age2832 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.09 0.13 
  [0.02]** *    [0.02]* [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]**
age3337 0.15 0.13 0.15 -0.00 0.00 
  [0.02]** [0.02]** **   [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
Wife is working outside of 
family 
-0.10 -0.05 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07 
  [0.02]** * * *  [0.02]* [0.02]* [0.01]* [0.02]**
Wife years education 12 or 
ove ab
0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 
  [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.02] [0.02] 
Wife years education 0-6 -0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Husband years education 
0-6 
0.05 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.01 
  [0.02]* [0.02]* [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] 
Husband years education 
12 and a
-0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 
bove 
  [0.03] [0.02] [0.02]* [0.02]* [0.02] 
Husband ancestry: hakka 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
  [0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Husband ancestry: -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 
mainlander 
  [0.03]* [0.02] [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** 
Living in a city -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
  [0.02]* [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]+ 
Live with parents-in-law 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01]** [0.01]** 
Husband’s inc 0.02 ome  -0.02 -0.00 0.02 
   [0.0 [0.0 [0.0 [0.01] 0] 1] 1]+ 
Constant 0.08 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.23 
  [0.04]+ [0.08]**  ** ** [0.03]** [0.04] [0.04]
Observations 3564 4776 4460 3788 3614 
R-squared 0.21   0.24 0.21 0.26 0.33 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * signi at 5%; ificant  ficant ** sign  at 1%
 
The result of 2SL is n T -6 an  Table 1-6 presents 
 The resu ort lt i  1-3 that mass m posure 
etworks play nt he ion trac knowledge.  
edicting contraceptive knowledge.  
S analys is listed i able 1 d 1-7.
the first stage. lts supp  the resu n Table edia ex
and social n  importa roles in t  acquisit  of con eptive 
The instruments are powerful in pr
24 
  
Table 1-6: The probabili ng SL ta
t sta mb chniq wn 
ty of givi  births, 2 S (first s ge) 
2SLS, firs ge, dv: nu er of contraceptive te ues kno
  1965 1967 6  197 1980 1985
Cumulative having no 
sons 
-0.63 -0.70 -0.60 0.02 -0.15 
 [0.12]** [0.12]** [0.11]** [0.10] [0.10] 
Number of live births 
until last year 
0.19 0.17 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 
  [0.03]**   [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.04]* [0.05] 
Age1822 0.43 0.08 0.00 -0.90 -0.06 
  [0.25]+ [0.22] [0.00] [0.31]** [0.26] 
age2327 0.73 0.43 -0.09 -0.31 0.50 
  [0.19]** [0.16]**   ** [0.16] [0.20] [0.17]
age2832 0.96 0.69 0.22 -0.06 0.33 
  [0.13]** [0.13]** [0.13] [0.19] [0.14]* 
age3337 0.64 0.56 0.38 0.16 0.17 
  [0.13]** [0.12]** [0.10]** [0.16] [0.12] 
Wife is working outside 
of family 
-0.00 0.26 0.15 0.06 0.23 
  [0.14] *   * [0.11] [0.13] [0.13] [0.09]
Wife’s education is 12 or 
above 
1.17 1.00 0.95 0.83 1.00 
  [0.37]** *  * * [0.27]* [0.15]** [0.13]* [0.11]*
Wife’s education is 0-6 .16 -1 -0.84 -0.69 -0.75 -0.88 
  [0.13]** [0.11]** [0.11]** [0.18]** [0.23]** 
Husband’s education is 
0-6 
1.36 1.00 0.80 0.59 0.64 
  [0.21]** [0.17]** [0.13]** ** ** [0.12] [0.10]
Husband’s education is 
 
.73 
12 or above
0 0.26 0.94 0.02 0.31 
  [0.32]*  [0.15]+ [0.33]** [0.26] [0.16]+
Husband’s ancest
hakka 
ry: .27 0.0 31 0.32 -0.14 -0.47 
  [0.19] [0.15]* [0.17]+ [0.16] [0.13]** 
Husband’s ancestry: 
ainlander 
.03 0.66 
m
0 0.57 0.02 0.78 
  [0.45] [0.18]**   ** [0.37] [0.24] [0.28]
Live in a city -0.16 -0.24 -0.26 -0.01 0.07 
  [0.09]+ [0.09]** .09]** [0.08] .08] [0 [0
Live with parents in law 0.41 0.84 0.50 0.21 0.29 
  [0.10]** [0.09]** ** + ** [0.13] [0.11] [0.09]
Listen to the radio 1.91 1.63 1.18 0.82 1.07 
  [0.21]** [0.16]** [0.13]** [0.15]** [0.13]** 
Read newspapers 0.10 -0.11 -0.40 -0.09 -0.09 
  [0.11] [0.09] [0.16]* [0.13] [0.10] 
Live wi
couples 
th married  -0.47 -0.47 -0.43 -0.90 
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 Table 1-6 (continued) 
   [0.09]** [0.11]** [0.13]** [0.27]** 
Husband’s income  0.48 0.09 0.38 0.24 
   [0.07]** [0.02]** [0.10]** [0.08]** 
Watch TV  0.70 0.85 0.29 -0.03 
   [0.13]** [0.12]** [0.12]* [0.15] 
Read magazines   0.90 0.84 0.53 
    [0.14]** [0.13]** [0.08]** 
Join Organization   0.49 0.43 0.52 
    [0.18]* [0.18]* [0.16]** 
Constant 3.16 1.15 1.46 6.57 6.62 
  [0.23]** [0.25]** [0.18]** [0.29]** [0.24]** 
F statistics      
Observations 3662 4868 4678 3852 3817 
R-squared 0.39 0.44 0.41 0.32 0.35 
Robust standard errors in bracket  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 1-7 presents the second stage. The results show that, conditional on the 
number of births until last year, one more contraceptive technique known prevents the 
likelihood of having births by 0.06, 0.03., 0.04, 0.05 and 0.05 last year in survey years 
of 1965, 1967, 1976, 1980, and 1985 respectively9. The more births each woman has 
had, the less likely she is to give birth, and the magnitude of this effect increases over 
e. This explains the number of births to each woman has been decreasing over time 
d any sons remain 
othe hi
horts ar ke e b n o s. ho are 
e fam ive birth. Wo h 
re likely to have given b centl ch mi flect the 
e relationship betw h ed n and ge an ess 
wh ently h p -law 
ore likely to have gi  re ut ly significant in 
                                                
tim
which reflects the decreasing birth rate. Women who have not ha
more likely to have an
exists. Younger co
r birth. T s shows that sex preference toward sons still 
e more li ly to hav irths tha lder one Women w
currently working outsid  of the ily are less likely to g men wit
higher education are mo irth re y, whi ght re
positiv een hig ucatio  young a s. Mainl ders are l
likely to give births than Fukiennese. Women o curr  live wit arents-in
are m ven birth cently, b the coefficients are on
 
9 The proportion of women who gave birth in the previous year is 0.440, 0.386, 0.363, 0.281, 0.262 in 
each survey year. 
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 1980 and 1985. Husband’s income is ly d w ro of 
rth.       
lity g b SLS  st
2SLS, second stage, dv: whether having births last year 
 positive associate ith the p bability 
giving bi
 
Table 1-7: The probabi  of givin irths, 2  (second age) 
  1965 0 1967 1976 198 1985
Number of contraceptive
chniques known  
 
te
-0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
  [0.02]** [0.01]**  [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** 
Cumulative having no sons 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.10 
 [0.03]* [0.02]** * * * [0.02]* [0.02]* [0.02]*
Number of live births until 
st year la
0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 
  [0.01] [0.00] [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** 
age1822 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.14 0.25 
  [0.05]** * * * [0.04]* [0.00] [0.04]* [0.04]*
age2327 0.55 0.50 0.31 0.18 0.28 
  [0.03]** * [0.03]* [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** 
age2832 0.44 0.34 0.29 0.09 0.15 
  [0.03]** * * * * [0.02]* [0.02]* [0.02]* [0.02]*
age3337 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.01 
  [0.03]** * * [0.02]* [0.02]* [0.02] [0.02] 
Wife is working out
mily 
side of .10 
fa
-0 -0.04 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 
  [0.02]** [0 * [0.02]* [0.02]* .02]** [0.01]** 
Wife’s education is 12 or 
above 
0.13 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.08 
  [0.06]* [0.04] [0.03]** [0.03]* [0.02]** 
Wife’s education is 0-6 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 
  [0.03]** [0.02]  [0.02]** ** [0.02] [0.03]
Husband’s education is 0-6 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.06 
  [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] 
Husband’s education is 12 
or above 
0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 
  [0.04]* [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]* 
Husband’s ancestry: hakka 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 
  [0.03]* [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
Husband’s ancestry: 
mainlander  
-0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 
  [0.03]+ [0.02] [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** 
Live in a city -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
  + [0.03] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]
Live with parents in law 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 
  [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]** [0.01]** 
Husband’s income  0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 
   [0.01] [0.00] [0.02]** [0.01]** 
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 Table 1-7 (continued)
Constan
 
t 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.75 0.68 
  [0.10]** [0.06]** [0.07]** [0.12]** [0.11]** 
Observations 3564 4773 4460 3788 3614 
R-squared 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.23 
Over-identification 
test(p-value) 
0.9775 0.6887 0.1788 0.2236 0.7259 
Standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
In general, the results indicate that contraceptive knowledge reduces fertility 
no matter whether that fertility is measured by life-time fertility or the probability of 
recently having given birth.  
 
Evaluating the IV strategy 
The instruments of contraceptive knowledge -- mass media exposure and social 
networ
tive 
es 
n 
y that 
ks – have a strong joint influence on the obtainment of contraceptive 
knowledge. This study would be able to identify the causal effect of contraceptive 
knowledge on fertility as long as the exclusion restriction is valid, that is, as long as 
mass media exposure and social networks affect fertility only through contracep
knowledge.  
Indeed, the over-identification test suggests that the instruments this study us
are valid especially in the likelihood of having births equation. The p-values to over 
identification tests are listed in Table 1-4 and 1-7. The null hypothesis that no 
association between contraceptive knowledge and error term in fertility equation fail 
to be rejected in the year 1965 and 1976 for total number of live births equation, and 
every survey year for the likelihood of having birth equation.  
However, a number of arguments still can be made to question exclusio
restriction.  First, mass media exposure and/or organization participation might not 
only expand contraceptive knowledge but also shape fertility attitudes in a wa
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 influences fertility demand.  If fertility attitudes changed through mass media 
exposu
olely 
 
amily.  
ight 
n 
of women who are not. 
hey might be different in observable ways. For example, women who are regularly 
exposed to mass media and/or hav orks might have a higher level of 
educati ight be 
n than 
t 
ble 
re influence the acquisition of contraceptive knowledge, then the coefficient on 
contraceptive knowledge in the second stage of the 2SLS approach does not s
reflect the effect of contraceptive knowledge on fertility; it also reflects the couple’s
attitudes about a desired number of children and/or the sex composition of their f
Women who are regularly exposed to mass media or who have a wider social network 
are more likely to have access to family planning messages on the benefits of having 
fewer children and access to knowledge of modern contraceptive techniques than 
women without that exposure.  If contraceptive attitudes and knowledge are 
correlated, the coefficient on contraceptive knowledge in the fertility equation m
not only reflect the contraceptive knowledge but also attitudes which lead to 
over-estimate the effect of contraceptive knowledge.  
Another argument concerning the validity of the instrumental variables used in 
this paper is based upon a hypothetical unobserved characteristic which may 
collectively drive contraceptive knowledge, mass media exposure and organizatio
participation. Women selected to the group with regular exposure to mass media 
and/or with wider social networks are different from the group 
T
e larger social netw
on, be younger, and be wealthier. On the other hand, it is possible they m
different in unobservable ways. For example, women with regular mass media 
exposure and wider social networks might be more open to new informatio
those with less exposure. These observable and unobservable characteristics migh
influence the fertility decision. While this study controls for differences in observa
characteristics, it does not control for differences in unobservable characteristics. If 
there is an unobservable difference between the two groups in the case described 
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 above, the coefficient on contraceptive knowledge might be biased upward a
reflect the true effect of contraceptive knowle
nd not 
dge on fertility.  
 
 attitudes toward family planning might lead to the 
dy takes the 
tudy uses h hav nform  on 
y planning eral tra  vi . 
des toward family planning and general nal in ertility 
quation in 2SLS aims to resolve ential i d g nsis
e effect on fertility.  
he results indicate that the s of total live birt
irths are very robust after taking into account women derni  
 toward family planning. T idence pr s the c ce to usa
 contraceptive knowledge t dy finds result isted
r of live b l ily attitudes 
ths equation (2SLS) 
Robustness Check 
In order to take into account the potential factors leading to the biased 
contraceptive knowledge effects listed in the section 7 -- the unobserved married 
couple’s modernity and
over-estimated contraceptive knowledge effect on fertility.  This stu
advantages of the affluent data sets this s  whic e the i ation
attitudes toward famil  and gen ditional ewpoints  It controls for 
the attitu  traditio  viewpo ts in the f
e  the pot ssues an et the co tent 
contraceptive knowledg
T equation hs and probability of 
having b ’s mo ty and
attitudes he ev ovide reden  the ca l 
effect of his stu . The s are l  in Table 1-8-1 
and Table 1-8-2.     
 
able 1-8-110: The numbe irths contro  for famT
The number of live bir
 1965 1967 1976 1980 1985
Contraceptive knowledge  -0.17 -0.10 -0.13 -0.18 -0.21
 [0.06]** [0 [ [ [0.03]** 0.03]** 0.04]** .03]**
Tradition 0.02 0.17 0.09 0.12 
 [0.09] [ [ [0.07]* 0.04]* 0.04]** 
Attitudes 0.42 0.44 0.27 0.06 0.11
 [0.11]** [0.08] [0.0 [0.0** 9]** [0.08] 4]**
                                                 
10 The variable, tradition, measures the married women’s viewpoints toward tradition. Tradition is coded 
with “1” if the respondents answer “definitely yes” or “probability yes” to the question “do you expect 
to live with your children or grandchildren in old age?”; and “0” otherwise.  The variable, attitude, 
measures the married women’s viewpoints toward family planning programs. Attitude is coded with “1” 
if the respondents answer “approve very much” or “approve” to the question “are you in favor of family 
planning/ contraception?”; and “0” otherwise.   
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 Table 1-8-1 (continued) 
No son -1.66 -1.71 -1.23 -0.96 -0.92
 [0.09]** [0.07]** [0.06]** [0.05]** [0.05]**
Age1822 -4.14 -3.88 0.00 -2.06 -1.78
 [0.14]** [0 [0.12]** [0.00] [0.10]** .09]**
Age2327 -3.36 -3.21 -2.25 -1.45 -1.21
 [ [0 [0 [0 [00.09]** .07]** .06]** .06]** .06]**
Age2832 -2.02 - --2.08 -1.46 0.78 0.73
 [0.08]** [0 [ [0 [0.06]** 0.05]** .06]** .06]**
Age3337 -0.78 -0.99 -0.59 - -0.21 0.33
 [0.08]** [0.07]** [0.05]** [0.06]** [0.05]**
Wife is working outside of family -0.25 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.18
 [0.0 [0 [0.0 [0.0 [0.07]** .06]* 5]** 4]** 4]**
Wife education is 12 or above -0.17 -0.52 -0.31 -0.23 -0.20
 [0.19] [0.13]** [0.09]** [0.08]** [0.07]**
Wife education is 0-6 -0.02 0.14 0.19 0.04 -0.23
 [0.10] [0.07]* [0.05]** [0.07] [0.08]**
Husband education is 0-6 0.22 0.05 0.10 0.17 0.01
 [0.07]** [0.0 [0. [06] 06]+ .07]* [0.11]
Husband education is 12 or above -0.01 0. -03 0.08 -0.12 -0.08
 [0.14] [0.09] [0.06] [0.06]* [0.05]
Husband’s ancestry: hakka 0.13 -0.09 0.09 -0.08 -0.07
 [0.10] [0.0 [0 [ [08] .07] 0.06] .06]
Husband’s ancestry: mainlander -0.51 -0 -0.35 -0.06 -0.21 .42
 [0.11]** [0.08]* [0 [0.0 [0.0* .05] 6]** 7]**
Living in a city -0.68 -0.13 -0.05 -0.18 -0.07
 [0.11]** [0.1 [0 [0.0] .07] 06]** [0.07]
Live with parents in law -0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.04 0.05
 [0.06]+ [0.0 [0 [5] .04] [0.04] 0.04]
Husband’s income 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.04
 [0.0 [0.0 [ [4] 1]* 0.04] 0.03]
Constant 6.91 6.25 4.80 4.77 5.35
 [0.37]** [0.22]** [0.20]** [0.28]** [0.28]**
Observations 3662 486 48 678 3852 3817
R-squared 0.50 0.51 0.44 0.39 0.35
Standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** si t 1gnificant a % 
 
Table 1-8-2: The probability of giving ntr m d
LS)  
births co ol for fa ily attitu es 
The probability of having birth (2S
 1965 1967 1976 1980 1985
Number of contraceptive knowledge 
nown k
-0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05
 [0. [0. [0. [0. [0.02]** 01]** 01]** 02]** 01]**
Tradition -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 n/a
 [ [ [ [00.03] 0.02] 0.02] .02]+ n/a
Attitudes 0.20 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.06
 [0.0 [0. [0.0 [ [0.04]** 03]** 4]** 0.04] 2]**
Cumulative having no sons -0.18 -0.08 -0.18 -0.08 -0.08
 [0.0 [0.0 [0. [0. [0.4]** 3]** 03]** 02]** 02]**
Number of live births until last year 0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.12 -0.11
 [ [ [0. [0. [0.0.01] 0.01] 01]** 01]** 01]**
age1822 0.34 0.41 0.00 0.21 0.28
 [0. [0. [ [0. [0.006]** 05]** 0.00] 06]** 5]**
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 Table 1-8-2 (continued) 
age2327 0.55 0.58 0.35 0.30 0.37
 [0 [ [0 [.05]** 0.03]** .04]** [0.03]** 0.03]**
age2832 0.53 0.45 0.39 0.19 0.23
 [0.04]** [0 [ [0.03]** 0.03]** .03]** [0.02]**
age3337 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.09 0.07
 [0.03]** [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.02]**
Wife is working outside of family -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06
 [0.03]** [0 [0.0 [0.0 [0.0.02]* 2]** 2]** 2]**
Wife education is 12 or above 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.14
 [0.07]* [0.04] [0.04]** [0.03]* [0.03]**
Wife education is 0-6 -0.10 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08
 [0.04]** [0.03] [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.03]*
Husband education is 0-6 0.02 -0.02 -0.030.02 0.02
 ] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04][0.03] [0.02
Husband 0.03 education is 12 or above 0.12 -0.01 0.02 0.05 
 .02][0.05]* [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]+ [0
Husband’s ancestry: hakka 0.07 0.04 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02
 [0.04]+ [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.02]
Husband’s ancestry: mainlander -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.08
 [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.02]** [0.03]**
Living in a city -0.13 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
 [0.04]** [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Live with parents in law -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.03
 [0.02] [0.02]+ [0.02] [0.02]** [0.02]+
Husband’s income -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
 [0.01] [0.00]+ [0.02] [0.01]**
Constant 0.64 0.29 0.58 0.98 0.80
 [0.13]** [0.08]** [0.09]** [0.13]** [0.12]**
Observations 2497 3567 3291 3032 3054
R-squared 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.25
Standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Conclusion/Discussion 
Taiwan’s family planning programs, enacted nationwide in 1964, aimed to 
decrease women’s fertility and control population growth. The programs changed 
married couples' fertility demand by educating them about population growth issues
and by disseminating knowledge of modern contraceptive methods.  This paper 
examines the effect of contraceptive knowledge on fertility, and focuses on the 
right after the family planning programs were enacted. In order to take into
consideration the endogeneity of c
, 
period 
 
ontraceptive knowledge in the fertility equation, this 
study uses the 2SLS approach. Mass media exposure and social networks are the 
32 
 proxies for acquired contraceptive knowledge. The empirical results indicate that 
contraceptive knowledge significantly reduces fertility, whether fertility is measured
as life-time fertility or the probability of giving birth.  
Besides, this paper found that mass media exposure and social networks play 
important roles in obtaining knowledge of modern contraceptive techniques.  Women 
who regularly watch TV, listen to the radio, or read newspapers and magazines are 
more likely to be exposed to contraceptive-related information and hence have more 
knowledge of contra
 
ceptives.  Similarly, women who participate in women’s 
organiz
e 
s 
ated but not statistically 
significant with the number of births. Demographic characteristics, such as ethnicity, 
age cohorts, and residency with parents-in-law are associated with fertility decisions. 
The preference toward sons is still existent in Taiwanese society. Women who haven’t 
had any sons are more likely to give birth, conditional upon the number of babies they 
have already had.  
There is a large body of literature investigating the relationship between 
knowledge and behaviors, covering different fields of interests, such as product 
consumption, risky behaviors, and health outcomes. Very few such studies focus on 
the relationship between contraceptive knowledge and fertility decision. This paper 
investigates the effect of contraceptive knowledge on fertility, and helps to shed new 
light on the relationship between knowledge and behaviors. 
ations are more likely to obtain contraceptive information through 
word-of-mouth communication.  
Price and income are the fundamental factors in the demand functions.  In th
fertility equation, women’s working status and years of schooling, which can serve a
proxies for the price (opportunity cost) of having children are negatively associated 
with fertility; income (husband’s income) is positively associ
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 CHAPTER 2: U.S. CIGARETTE DEMAND: 1944-2004 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we use data from 23 national cross-sectional surveys conducted by 
the Gallup Poll from 1944 through 2004 to estimate standard two-part models of 
cigarette demand as a function of demographics, income, and cigarette prices.  
Because the data cover a long time span, we are able to study cigarette demand before 
and during the early years of tobacco control efforts, as well as during the most recent 
period.  Our results show that from 1944 to 2004: the gender difference in smoking 
rates almost disappears; the black-white difference reverses; a strong gradient with 
schooling emerges; and the negative income elasticities strengthened in magnitude.  
The various and varying demographic influences on cigarette demand are potentially 
fruitful areas for future health economics research.  We further examine the issue of 
the unobserved state-level factors and their relationship to cigarette prices over the 
period from 1944 to 2004.   
 
Introduction 
Cigarette smoking has continued to be one of the major causes of premature 
death in the U.S.11  The release of the Surgeon General’s report in 1964 gave the 
endorsement of the government and first spread the information of smoking-related 
health hazards to the public.  After 1964, the Surgeon General’s reports kept 
releasing information on smoking-related health risks and claiming that cigarette 
smoking was the most important preventable cause of premature death not only for 
smokers themselves but also for secondhand smokers.  A number of policies, 
interventions, and tobacco control efforts – raising cigarette taxes, restricting smoking 
                                                 
11  http://www.cdc.gov/MMWR/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5114a2.htm.  
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 in public places, putting health warnings on cigarette products, and disseminating the 
information of scientific and clinical evidence on smoking-related health hazards – 
have been implemented as attempts to reduce cigarette smoking. 
There have been several studies examining the response of cigarette 
consumption to cigarette prices and smoking regulations, which vary across states and 
times, and other studies examining smoking behaviors among different socioeconomic 
strata either using aggregate data at the nationwide or state level (for example, Keeler 
et al., 2001; Sloan et al., 2002) or using micro data at the individual level (for example, 
Sloan and Trogdon, 2004; Wasserman et al., 1991).   Indeed, individual-level data 
which contain detailed information on demographic characteristics allow examination 
of the effects of gender, income, schooling and other socioeconomic indicators on 
smoking behaviors.  Important socioeconomic characteristics, such as income and 
schooling, have been shown to be inversely associated with smoking behaviors.  Past 
literature analyzing the effect of cigarette prices, regulations, and related 
socioeconomic indicators have focused on short periods of time.   
There have, however, been enormous changes in individual and governmental 
attitudes toward cigarette smoking, in the available knowledge on health risks from 
smoking, and in the tobacco industry's marketing strategies over the past half century.  
Smoking cigarettes was not publicly perceived as dangerous until the late 1950s.  
Information concerning smoking-related health hazards was gradually disseminated to 
the public between 1950 and 1970 (DeWalque, 2004).  After the 1964 Surgeon 
General’s report, the government started to aggressively implement several 
interventions, such as raising the tax on cigarettes, placing warning labels on cigarette 
products, generating anti-smoking campaigns for public media, and banning cigarette 
advertisements from television, to reduce cigarette smoking.  Tobacco companies, 
adapted by introducing alternative products such as light and filtered cigarettes, and by 
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 disseminating contradictory messages about the safety of cigarettes to the 
government's negative messages about tobacco use (Sloan et al., 2002).  
Therefore, price, income, and socioeconomic indicators, such as gender, 
schooling, and race, might relate differently to cigarette smoking behavior over time. 
Wasserman et al. (1991) found that price elasticity has become increasingly negative 
over time from the 1970s to the 1980s.  Men were initially far more likely to smoke 
than women, but the gender gap in smoking rates has decreased over time (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 1999).  DeWalque (2004) found that smoking prevalence was 
similar for individuals in all education categories around 1940, but by 2000 there was 
an inverse association between educational achievement and the smoking decision.  
Smoking has also undergone a substantial shift in its association with personal; 
cigarettes were a normal good around the 1970s, but changed to an inferior good in the 
late 1980s (Wasserman, 1991).  Tracking back cigarette consumption and expanding 
the time span of analysis allows us see the patterns of cigarette consumption and its 
associations with economic determinants, such as price and income, and 
non-economic determinants, such as gender, race, and schooling over time.  
To our knowledge, Sloan et al. (2002) and DeWalque (2004) are the only 
smoking-related studies which cover over half the twentieth century where the 
dramatic changes in attitudes toward tobacco products occur.  Sloan et al. (2002) use 
aggregate data at the nationwide level from 1900 to 1998 to see the impacts of 
cigarette price, health information, and per capita income on cigarette consumption. 
DeWalque (2004) uses retrospective information the respondents provided on smoking 
history from National Health Interview Survey (NHIS).  He investigates smoking 
prevalence across different educational levels and analyzes the impacts of schooling 
on smoking prevalence, initiation, and cessation in the United States from 1940 to 
2000.  Using aggregate data or retrospective data analyzing the economic and 
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 non-economic determinants on cigarette consumption might be valid in its own right.  
However, aggregate data fails to capture adequately the associations of individual 
characteristics, such as gender, income, and schooling on cigarette consumption, and 
the retrospective information on smoking behaviors will cause errors in classification 
of smoking status for some person-years which lead to inaccurately measured 
influences of cigarette prices.  In addition, the retrospective data might not be able to 
accurately capture the influences of the time-variant determinants, such as income, on 
cigarette demand.  
We use 23 repeated cross-sections from 1944 to 2004 conducted by Gallup 
Polls which provide information on current smoking behaviors and socioeconomic 
characteristics.  Having individual data which covers over half of the century allows 
examination of the associates of price and income on cigarette consumption and the 
patterns of smoking behaviors across gender, race, and educational levels over time.  
Our results show that it is important to recognize that the influences of 
economic and non-economic factors on cigarette demand change over time.  From 
1944 to 2004 the economic factors (especially income) change from having no 
statistically significant effects to being negatively associated with cigarette smoking; 
the negative associations strengthen in magnitude over time.  The influences of 
non-economic factors (gender, race, and schooling) on cigarette demand also change 
over time.  From 1944 to 2004, the gender difference in smoking rates almost 
disappears, the black-white difference reverses, and a strong gradient with schooling 
emerges.   
 
Literature Review 
A few studies cover a segment of time-span and analyze the time-patterns of 
the associations between the determinants of cigarettes smoking and smoking 
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 behaviors. Some studies focus on economic determinants, such as cigarette price and 
income; others focus on non-economic determinants, such as gender, education, and 
race. 
Sloan et al. (2002) analyze a century of national aggregate data on cigarette 
consumption, from 1900 to 1999. The large time span allows this study to take into 
account the changing attitudes of the federal government toward cigarette smoking. In 
the first half of the century, the government actually promoted smoking. During World 
War I and II, cigarettes were issued to soldiers and the government subsidized the sale 
to soldiers.  However, since 1964, when the U.S. Surgeon General’s report first stated 
a link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, information on the health-related 
risks of cigarette smoking has been consistently available to the public.    
Sloan et al. (2002) uses a rational addiction framework analyzing per capita 
cigarette consumption as a function of cigarette prices, lagged and future consumption, 
per capita disposable income, and health-risk information concerning cigarette 
smoking. This study introduces a series of qualitative variables (0, 1) to reflect the 
timing of various public announcements, policies, and new health information. It 
examines cigarette consumption in the whole century, 1900-1997, and the sub-century, 
1950-1997, respectively. Sloan et al. (2002) found an average price elasticity of -0.15 
and income elasticity of 0.15. Besides, they concluded that the influence of 
smoking-related health risk on cigarette consumption is less important than is 
generally believed. Finally, their test for structural changes in demand indicates the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of single structural demand for the full century.  
Indeed, this study contributes in several ways. First, it expands the analysis to 
the entire 20th century, which covers all important cigarette-related events and 
interventions. This extensive date range helps examine how information affected 
demand over time; results usually occur years after policy changes. This approach also 
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 enables the investigators to see the patterns of overall cigarette consumption 
associated with interventions at different historical moments.  However, it sheds little 
light on the understanding of cigarette smoking.  The study only provides 
century-long averages (-0.15 price elasticity and 0.15 income elasticity) for the 
relationship between economic factors, such as cigarette prices and income, and 
smoking behavior. Several previous studies (for example, Keeler et al. 2001 and 
Wasserman et al. 1991), however, have found that price elasticity and income 
elasticity have been changing over years or decades.  
Keeler et al. (2001) uses annual data for the panel of U.S. states over the period 
1960-1990 in examination of the effect of cigarette prices on cigarette consumption. In 
order to allow variations on the determinants of cigarette smoking over decades, this 
study stratifies the data by decades, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and estimates separate 
regressions for each decade. In this study, cigarette consumption is measured as a 
function of cigarette prices, per capita income, education, and other demographic 
characteristics of the population, such as religion, marital status, race, gender, and age. 
All variables are measured at the state aggregate level. The results indicate that the 
correction for omitted-variable bias makes cigarettes less price elastic than previous 
literature had found. Price elasticity changed from about -0.8 in the 1960s to a range of 
-0.2 - -0.3 in the 1980s.12 This study provides a possible explanation for the decreasing 
price elasticity. As more and more people have quit smoking, the remaining smokers 
are more likely to be “hard-core” smokers, who are less responsive to cigarette prices. 
Income elasticities were positive, ranging from 0.2 to 0.3. The results also indicated a 
strong education effect on cigarette smoking; a change from no high school diploma to 
a college degree entails a significant reduction in smoking. The study included 
                                                 
12 Wasserman et al. (1992), however, found that price elasticities of cigarette demand have been more 
and more negative over time from 1974 to 1985.  
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 demographic characteristics, such as gender and race, in its analysis.  The results 
indicate that, in the 1960s, African American cigarette consumption statistically 
increases, but the results are sensitive across different specifications. In 1970s, and 
1980s, there are no significant differences in cigarette consumption across races. 
Gender-linked results are inconclusive. Coefficients on gender in each decade do not 
explain much, because the gender compositions are very similar from state to state. It 
is hard to determine gender effects with state-level data.     
This study contributes in several ways. First of all, it covers a relatively long 
period of time (1960s-1980s) and separates the data with decade-by-decade analysis. 
This approach allows the investigators to examine the time-patterns of the associations 
between factors and cigarette smoking. Secondly, having the panel state-level data 
helps correct omitted variables, such as anti-smoking sentiment varying by state, 
which might bias the effect of cigarette prices. However, there are some drawbacks to 
using state-level aggregate data. First, due to the data limitation, this study fails to 
investigate the smoking decision measured by smoking prevalence. Second, using 
state-level aggregate data might shed some lights on the effects of economic factors, 
such as cigarette prices and per capita income, on cigarette consumption, but it fails to 
gauge the effects of individual demographic characteristics, such as gender, race, 
education, on the smoking decision.  
 There have been several studies using individual level data, from the National 
Health Interview Survey, to examine smoking behavior and the time-patterns of the 
effects of its determinants. Fiore et al. (1989) and Pierce et al. (1989) use seven 
National Health Interview Surveys, from 1974 to 1985, to analyze smoking prevalence, 
cessation, and initiation across gender, race, and education.  
 The results indicated that smoking prevalence is higher for men than for women 
in each survey year from 1974 to 1985. The overall estimated prevalence of smoking 
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 among adults in the United States has decreased steadily. Furthermore, the rate of 
decline in smoking prevalence for men was statistically larger than the rate for women. 
This study predicts that if these trends continue into 1990s, smoking rates for men and 
women will converge. In terms of smoking cessation across gender, the study shows 
that a higher proportion of men than women have quit smoking in the study period. In 
terms of smoking initiation across gender, the study shows that smoking initiation, 
which is measured by smoking prevalence among 20- to 24-year-olds, has fallen 
rapidly in young men. On the contrary, smoking initiation has stayed the same in 
young women. This study therefore indicates that differences in initiation rates rather 
than in cessation rates are mostly responsible for the converging rates of smoking 
prevalence among men and women.  
 Regarding smoking disparity across race, this study shows that blacks smoked at 
higher rates than whites in every survey year between 1974 and 1985. This study 
pointed out that this disparity may diminish because among black men smoking 
prevalence and initiation decreased at a faster rate and the quit ratio increased at a 
faster rate than among white men.    
 Regarding education, the results indicate that smoking prevalence declined across 
all educational levels from 1974 to 1985 and that smoking prevalence is lower for 
more educated individuals. Furthermore, among college graduates smoking prevalence 
dropped more precipitously than among other educational counterparts. In terms of 
smoking cessation, the quit ratio increased across all education categories during the 
study period, with highly educated people in a consistent higher quit ratio than other 
educational counterparts. In terms of smoking initiation, people who attend college are 
less likely to initiate smoking than those who do not. This is true across gender 
categories. In summary, this study indicates that educational level has become the 
major demographic factor of the smoking decision.  
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  Fiore et al. (1989) and Pierce et al. (1989) contribute important information to the 
literature. First, they examine smoking prevalence in sufficient detail to separate 
overall smoking behaviors into cessation and initiation. This contribution helps 
researchers understand the formulation of the smoking decision and the factors which 
have different impacts on prevalence, cessation, and initiation respectively. Second, 
they investigate smoking behaviors as a function of gender, race, and education every 
survey year. Finally, they examine the time- patterns of the associations of gender- 
smoking, race- smoking, and education- smoking.    
 There are some drawbacks to these studies. In examination of smoking behaviors, 
this study does not take into account of economic factors, such as cigarette price and 
income which are correlated with the outcome and predictors of the outcomes of this 
study: smoking prevalence, and gender and race, respectively. For example, income is 
associated with smoking decision, and confounding with education. Without taking 
these factors into consideration, the estimated coefficients might be biased from the 
true effects on cigarette smoking.    
 Wasserman et al. (1991) uses individual level data, the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS), spanning the 1970s and 1980s, to investigate cigarette smoking. This 
study put emphases on the effects of cigarette prices, income, and smoking regulations, 
as well as demographic characteristics. With the significant coefficients on the 
price-year, income-year, and education-year interaction terms, the results indicate that 
the effects of cigarette prices, income, and education on cigarette smoking are 
changing over time.  
 The results indicate that price elasticities become more and more negative over 
time. The price elasticity is 0.059 in 1970, -0.017 in 1974 and reaches -0.226 in 1985. 
The income elasticities changed from positive to negative, ranging from 0.051 in 1970 
to -0.023 in 1985, but the negative income elasticities in the late 1970s and 1980s are 
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 not statistically different from zero. Cigarette consumption decreases as education 
increases. Furthermore, individuals with higher levels of education decrease their 
cigarette consumption much more over time than the less educated.  
 Smoking regulations imposed at the state level decreases cigarette consumption. 
After controlling for smoking regulations, price coefficients drop dramatically. The 
price elasticities estimated in this study are smaller than what other studies have found. 
This study argues that the regulation index, which serves as the proxy for anti-smoking 
sentiment, reduces the omitted variable bias in the estimated price coefficients.  
 This study contributes in some ways. It is the first study to take into account the 
smoking regulation index. It found that smoking regulation is negatively associated 
with individual cigarette smoking. Also, adding smoking regulation in the smoking 
equation reduces the omitted variable bias in the estimated price coefficient. 
Additionally, this study indicates that the influences of price, income, and education 
on cigarette smoking are changing over time. The price elasticities become more and 
more negative over time. The income elasticities change from positive to negative 
over time. Educated individuals decrease cigarette smoking by a much larger margin 
over time than do those with less education. Finally, this study tries a two-part model, 
which separately estimates the smoking decision and smoking level conditional upon 
smokers. This method helps clarify the decision of cigarette smoking and the factors 
that influence the decision.   
 While previous literature indicates that the effects of gender and race on cigarette 
smoking are changing over time (Pierce et al. 1989 and Fiore et al. 1989), this study 
assumes that the influences of gender and race stay the same over time. In addition, 
even though this study shows the time-patterns of the influences of some factors on 
cigarette smoking, it only covers the years from 1970 to 1989. Without covering the 
earlier years in the 1950s and 1960s, in which cigarette smoking started to be 
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 perceived as the cause of lung cancer, and the later years in the 1990s and 2000s, in 
which several national and state-level smoking interventions have been imposed, it 
only indicates one segment in the overall span of smoking evolution.  
 The Gallup data, which provides the individual- level information on cigarette 
smoking and spans from 1944 to 2004, hence, allows us to avoid the limitations of the 
previous studies and advance our understanding of the evolution of cigarette smoking.   
 
Data 
The data used in this analysis come from Gallup Polls conducted by the Gallup 
organization. Gallup Polls are national public opinion polls of non-institutionalized 
civilians aged 18 and over, asking their opinions about politics, social circumstances, 
policies, and a variety of other questions. This analysis uses all years from the Gallup 
surveys, which provide information related to tobacco use such as current smoking 
status, number of cigarettes smoked per day, knowledge of health-related risk of 
smoking, and attitudes toward smoking. In addition, Gallup Polls also include 
demographic information, such as gender, race, education attainment, age, and annual 
household income. This study uses the Gallup Poll surveys which provide 
smoking-related information: 1944, 1949, 1954, 1957, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1977, 1981, 
1986, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 
2004.13
Gallup Polls also provide information on the state in which the respondents 
currently live. Knowing the geographic locations allows us to link each state’s average 
cigarette price, tax, and state anti-smoking sentiment measure to each individual 
observation. The state’s average cigarette price and tax data come from The Tax 
                                                 
13 1944, 1949, 1954, 1957, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1977, and 1981 Gallup Polls are face-to-face interview 
surveys.  Gallup Polls in 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, and 2005 are telephone surveys.  
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 Burden on Tobacco in 2005. The anti-smoking sentiment measures come from 
TUS-CPS14.  The state regulations to clean indoor air restrictions are from several 
sources: Impacteen website, CDC (STATE system website), and the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, 1986b.  The sample size for the twenty-three years of 
Gallup Polls is 30,208 with around 1,000 observations for each survey year. 
 
Reliability of Gallup Poll Data 
Gallup Poll data have not been widely used in economic literature. Studies tend 
to access this data to analyze public opinion on politics, inflation, unemployment, and 
poverty. Gallup Poll data also provide information on smoking behaviors, knowledge, 
and attitudes. However, there are only a few studies using Gallup Poll data to deal with 
smoking-related topics. These studies used the Gallup data to provide trends of 
tobacco use and smoking risk knowledge as supplement to their primary object of 
study (for example, Viscusi, 1992; Viscusi and Hakes, 2006), but none of them further 
examine specific effects, such as prices, regulations, or demographic identifiers on 
tobacco use. 
Since only a few studies source Gallup Poll data, and none of them used 
Gallup Polls in examining the effects of cigarette price and demographic identifiers on 
tobacco use, there might be some concerns about the reliability of Gallup Poll data. 
We therefore compare the data on smoking prevalence from Gallup Polls with the data 
from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to see if there is any consistency in 
the measurement of smoking prevalence across different data sets.  
This study divides the sample by gender and compares smoking prevalence 
between men and women across different data sets (See Table 2-1 for details15). Even 
                                                 
14 The anti-smoking sentiment measure is provided by Decicca et al. (2007). See Decicca et al. (2007) 
for the detail.  
15 We borrow the information on smoking prevalence across years and gender in NHIS from Wasserman 
et al. (1991). 
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 though Gallup Polls do not cover the exact same survey years as the NHIS16, this 
study compares close survey years. Smoking prevalence as measured by the Gallup 
Poll is similar with prevalence measured by the NHIS, but the smoking prevalence 
from the Gallup Poll is always slightly higher – about 3 to 4 percentage points on 
average. The measurement differences across the two data sets are very consistent over 
time.17  
 
Table 2-1: Comparing the Smoking Status Reported in NHIS and Gallup Poll  
Smoking decision (current smoker, %) 
 Gallup  NHIS18
Year male female year Male female 
1969 45.6 36.3 1970 42.5 31.2 
1971 47.5 37.9 1974 42.7 32.3 
1972 46.4 38.4 1976 41.6 32.5 
1977 42.0 34.7 1979 36.8 30.4 
1981 38.2 31.1 1980 36.6 30.1 
1987 31.1 28.1 1983 33.7 29.5 
1988 32.1 28.3 1985 31.5 29.9 
 
Descriptive Summary 
The descriptive statistics for each survey year are listed in Table 2-2. The 
smoking prevalence among national adults has been decreasing over years. Almost 
half of the national adults in our sample were current smokers in 1940s: 49% of adults 
smoked in 1944 and 46% in 1949. In the following three decades, the 1950s, 1960s, 
                                                 
16 See Wasserman (1991).  
17 The reason why smoking prevalence measured in Gallup Polls is always higher than prevalence 
measured in the NHIS might be attributable to a difference in the way questions are asked. In the NHIS, 
respondents are first asked, “Have you ever smoked 100 cigarettes?” If the respondent answers, “Yes,” 
s/he is asked, “Do you smoke now?” People who have never smoked 100 cigarettes or above are never 
asked, “Do you smoke now?” Gallup, however, asks the respondents, “Do you smoke now?” without 
first asking them, “Have you ever smoked 100 cigarettes?” The measurement of smoking decision is 
much stricter in the NHIS than in the Gallup Poll.     
18 The information of smoking decision from NHIS is from Wasserman (1988).   
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 and early 1970s, the smoking prevalence among adults decreased very slightly, and 
overall smoking prevalence hovered around 41% to 42%. Beginning in the late 1970s, 
the smoking prevalence began declining fairly steadily. 35% of national adults were 
current smokers in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 30% in the late 1980s, 25% in the 
1990s, and 23% in the 2000s.  
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 In addition to smoking status, Gallup Polls provide information on cigarette 
consumption (the number of cigarettes smoked per day) if respondents were current 
smokers19. Compared to the declining pattern of smoking prevalence over time, 
cigarette consumption for smokers differed very little. The average number of 
cigarettes consumed per day stayed around 18 in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s. The number of cigarettes consumed decreased to around 16 in the 1990s and 
decreased further to 15 in the 2000s.  
The composition of the sample is very consistent across different survey years. 
The average age is around 45 in each survey year. White are in the majority – over 
80% of the sample. Gender is evenly distributed in the sample. The number of years of 
schooling has increased over time.  In 1944, only 20% of people in the sample had a 
college diploma or some level of college education, and more than half population, 
around 60% of the sample, did not have a high school degree. In the 1990s and 2000s, 
around 60% of the sample had a college diploma or some level of college education, 
and around 90% of the people in our sample at least had a high school diploma.  
 
Empirical Models and Variables 
We first estimate two-part models of adult smoking: using a linear probability 
model for the estimation of smoking participation and an OLS model for the smoking 
level conditional upon participation.  In order to investigate the time-patterns of the 
influences of the determinants on smoking behaviors, we first divide the sample by 
decades, and estimate the regressions in 1940s, 1950s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.  
We have three reasons for this specification. First, this method helps to investigate the 
time-patterns of the associations between economic and non- economic determinants 
and smoking participation. The non-economic determinants are gender, race, education, 
                                                 
19 1957, 1971, 1972 Gallup Polls did not ask smokers how much they smoked per day.  
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 and age; the economic determinants are price and income. Secondly, instead of using 
cross-sectional analysis, pooling surveys by decades allows us to control for 
unobserved factors varying at the state level and affecting smoking participation. 
Finally, compared with cross-sectional analysis, pooling surveys by decades increases 
the sample size and the accuracy of estimation, given the small sample size in each 
survey year.  
In addition, we pool all years of data from 1944 to 2004 and put in a cohort 
dummy and its interaction with gender to capture the cohort effect across gender on 
cigarette demand.  We also pool all years of data from 1970 to 2004 and put in 
interaction terms of year and cigarette prices, as well as year and household income to 
investigate the changes of cigarette price influence and income influence over time.   
The dependent variables for the empirical models of adults smoking are 
measures of smoking participation and smoking level conditional upon being current 
smokers.   Smoking participation is measured in this way: if the respondent 
answered “yes” to the question “Do you smoke now?” or to “Have you, yourself, 
smoked any cigarettes in the past week?” participation is coded as “1”; otherwise it is 
coded as “0.” 20 In the Gallup survey, the smoking level question is “about how many 
cigarettes do you smoke per day?” Before 1997, the Gallup survey provides several 
response categories for respondents to fit in. We take the midpoint of each category 
and assign it to the individuals who belong to the category. After 1997, the Gallup 
survey started to ask respondents to provide the exact number of cigarettes smoked per 
day.  We keep the numbers of cigarettes the respondents provided in the regressions.   
The explanatory variables are age, age squared, gender, race, education, annual 
household income, and cigarette price. The average price is calculated yearly for every 
state and weighted by type of sale.  Data on annual household income that the Gallup 
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 Polls provide for each survey year are categorical.  In order to get a continuous 
variable on annual household income, we take the midpoint of each household income 
category, and assign it to each individual who belongs to that category.  All data on 
cigarette prices and annual household incomes are deflated to 1982 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).  
This paper uses the same measures of state-level anti-smoking sentiment as the 
measures in Decicca et al. (2008).  The measures are extracted from TUS-CPS in 
1992-1993.  They measure the general opinions on topics such as policies restricting 
smoking, the promotion and advertising of tobacco products, and whether respondents 
allow smoking in their homes.  From the responses to the attitudes questions, the 
indicators are measured which reflect the attitudes toward smoking in general and 
called the anti-smoking sentiments measures.   
Since the newly enacted laws on restricting smoking in public places in the first 
half twentieth century starts in 1960 in Delaware (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 1986).  We reported the smoking regulations in public places at the 
state level since 1960.  Data on regulations restricting smoking in public places came 
from several sources.  The regulations from 1960 to 1986 are primarily from reports 
published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1986a, b), which 
includes the abstracts of the applicable laws.  The regulations from 1991 to 1994 are 
from the Impacteen website, and the regulations from 1995 to 2008 are from STATE 
system website from CDC.       
These sources provide information on whether and when a particular state 
implemented smoking restriction regulations in public places such ass child care 
centers, cultural facilities, government worksites, health care facilities, private schools, 
private worksites, public schools, public transit, recreational facilities, restaurants, and 
shopping malls.  We follow the criteria Wasserman et al (1991) used and collapse 
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 these regulations into a regulation index measuring different types of regulations on 
smoking in public places. A state that regulates smoking in places where people spend 
a large portion of time received a higher score than a state that only regulates smoking 
in unimportant places.  If a state restricts smoking at private worksites, it receives a 
score of one.  If a state restricts smoking in restaurants and not at private worksites, it 
receives a score of 0.75.  If a state restricts smoking in private schools, public schools, 
public transit, recreational facilities, and shopping malls, but not at private worksites 
or restaurants, it receives a score of 0.5.  If a state only restricts smoking in some 
places, such as child care centers, government worksites, and health care facilities, it 
receives a score of 0.25.  If a state doesn’t restrict smoking in any places, it receives a 
score of 0.     
     
Results 
Regressions by Decades 
 Table 2-3 and 2-4 present results for a two-part model of cigarette demand 
dividing the pooled sample by decades.  We use four different model specifications:   
1. Does not include state fixed effects or clean indoor air regulations; 
2. Only includes state clean indoor air regulations; 
3. Only includes state fixed effects; 
4. Includes both state fixed effects and clean indoor air regulations.   
The results of smoking participation with different model specifications are 
presented in Tables 2-3-1, 2-3-2, 2-3-3, and 2-3-4.  The results of smoking level with 
different model specifications are presented in Tables 2-4-1, 2-4-2, 2-4-3, and 2-4-4.  
The sample is broken down by decades, and cigarette demand is estimated separately 
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 in the 1940s, 1950s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s21.  This approach provides 
larger sample sizes than are available for single survey years, but still allows the 
influences of the demographic and economic variables to vary over time.   
 
Table 2-3-1: Smoking Participation (Linear Probability Model with State Fixed 
Effects)  
Smoking participation, linear probability model, with SFE  
 1940s 1950s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Age -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
  [0.00]** [0.00]* [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]**
Age square 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
  [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]**
Lesshigh -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.14
  [0.03]+ [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.06]*
Highdrop -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.13
  [0.03] [0.02]+ [0.02]* [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.03]**
some college -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04
  [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.02]** [0.01]** [0.02]*
College  -0.01 -0.07 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.15
  [0.03] [0.04]+ [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.01]** [0.02]**
Male 0.17 0.21 0.1 0.06 0.03 0.03
  [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]* [0.01]*
White -0.23 -0.06 -0.02 0 0.04 0.06
  [0.03]** [0.03]* [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]* [0.02]**
Realtax 0.12       
  [0.81]       
Realprice   0.45 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.03
    [0.50] [0.18] [0.24] [0.11] [0.05]
Income    0 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04
     [0.02] [0.02]** [0.01]** [0.01]**
Constant 1.11 -0.12 0.36 -0.04 0.24 0.07
  [0.13]** [0.48] [0.19]+ [0.25] [0.14] [0.12]
Price 
elasticity 0.04 0.91 -0.09 0.10 -0.13 0.24
Income 
elasticity  0 -0.20** -0.21** -0.17**
Observations 3160 2869 5843 4287 5796 4703
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08
Robust standard errors in bracket 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
                                                 
21 In 1960s, the Gallup organization only conducted the smoking related survey in 1969. Since there is 
only one year of data in the 1960s, we include 1969 to 1970s regressions in Table 2 and 3.  
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 Table 2-3-2: Smoking Participation (Linear Probability Model with Clean Indoor Air 
Index) 
Smoking participation: linear probability model, with year dummies and index 
 1940s 1950s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Age -0.016 0.007 0.008 0.019 0.011 0.009 
 [0.003]** [0.004]+ [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** 
Age square 0.010 -0.015 -0.015 -0.023 -0.015 -0.013 
 [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** 
Lesshigh -0.057 -0.018 0.003 -0.018 0.031 0.134 
 [0.028]* [0.023] [0.020] [0.026] [0.036] [0.054]* 
Highdrop -0.029 0.026 0.042 0.069 0.077 0.132 
 [0.026] [0.019] [0.021]* [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.032]** 
Somecol -0.005 -0.045 -0.021 -0.061 -0.066 -0.041 
 [0.035] [0.042] [0.018] [0.019]** [0.012]** [0.018]* 
College -0.016 -0.071 -0.136 -0.142 -0.135 -0.152 
 [0.031] [0.037]+ [0.021]** [0.017]** [0.014]** [0.015]** 
Male 0.167 0.208 0.102 0.063 0.028 0.027 
 [0.030]** [0.026]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.011]* [0.011]* 
White -0.238 -0.047 -0.032 0.007 0.031 0.069 
 [0.026]** [0.030] [0.022] [0.023] [0.015]* [0.017]** 
Realtax 0.250      
 [0.165]      
Realprice  -0.104 0.149 0.064 0.013 -0.029 
  [0.159] [0.055]** [0.113] [0.045] [0.017]+ 
Income   0.008 -0.079 -0.052 -0.039 
   [0.015] [0.017]** [0.010]** [0.009]** 
Index   -0.050 -0.018 -0.005 0.033 
   [0.056] [0.024] [0.019] [0.021] 
Constant 1.093 0.462 0.214 0.022 0.173 0.188 
 [0.091]** [0.133]** [0.067]** [0.128] [0.062]** [0.071]* 
Price 
elasticity 
0.09 -0.21 0.34** 0.18 0.07 -0.25+ 
Income 
elasticity 
  0.02 -0.23** -0.23** -0.17** 
Observations 3160 2869 5843 4287 5796 4703 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2-3-3: Smoking Participation (Linear Probability Model) 
Smoking participation: w/o wasserman index and w/o state fixed effects 
 1940s 1950s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Age -0.016 0.007 0.008 0.019 0.011 0.009 
 [0.003]** [0.004]+ [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** 
Age square 0.010 -0.015 -0.015 -0.023 -0.015 -0.013 
 [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** 
Lesshigh -0.057 -0.018 0.003 -0.018 0.031 0.132 
 [0.028]* [0.023] [0.020] [0.026] [0.036] [0.054]* 
Highdrop -0.029 0.026 0.043 0.069 0.077 0.131 
 [0.026] [0.019] [0.021]* [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.032]** 
Somecol -0.005 -0.045 -0.021 -0.061 -0.066 -0.041 
 [0.035] [0.042] [0.018] [0.019]** [0.012]** [0.018]* 
College -0.016 -0.071 -0.137 -0.143 -0.135 -0.152 
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 Table 2-3-3 (continued) 
 [0.031] [0.037]+ [0.021]** [0.017]** [0.014]** [0.015]** 
Male 0.167 0.208 0.102 0.063 0.028 0.027 
 [0.030]** [0.026]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.011]* [0.011]* 
White -0.238 -0.047 -0.030 0.008 0.031 0.069 
 [0.026]** [0.030] [0.022] [0.024] [0.015]* [0.017]** 
Realtax 0.250      
 [0.165]      
Realprice  -0.104 0.131 0.039 0.007 -0.015 
  [0.159] [0.056]* [0.106] [0.042] [0.016] 
Income   0.009 -0.079 -0.052 -0.039 
   [0.015] [0.017]** [0.010]** [0.009]** 
Constant 1.093 0.462 0.230 0.036 0.177 0.182 
 [0.091]** [0.133]** [0.070]** [0.128] [0.063]** [0.071]* 
Price 
elasticity 
0.09 -0.21 0.30* 0.11 0.04 -0.13 
Income 
elasticity 
  0.02 -0.23** -0.23** -0.17** 
Observations 3160 2869 5843 4287 5796 4703 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2-3-4: Smoking Participation (Linear Probability Model with State Fixed Effects 
and Clean Indoor Air index) 
Smoking participation: w/state fixed effects and w/ wasserman index 
 1940s 1950s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Age -0.016 0.008 0.008 0.019 0.011 0.009 
 [0.004]** [0.004]* [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** 
Age square 0.010 -0.016 -0.015 -0.023 -0.015 -0.013 
 [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** 
Lesshigh -0.051 -0.005 0.011 -0.017 0.025 0.140 
 [0.029]+ [0.024] [0.020] [0.028] [0.037] [0.055]* 
Highdrop -0.024 0.033 0.043 0.061 0.075 0.130 
 [0.026] [0.019]+ [0.022]+ [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.033]** 
Somecol -0.006 -0.047 -0.022 -0.064 -0.065 -0.041 
 [0.035] [0.042] [0.018] [0.020]** [0.012]** [0.019]* 
College -0.012 -0.067 -0.135 -0.144 -0.136 -0.150 
 [0.031] [0.039]+ [0.020]** [0.017]** [0.014]** [0.016]** 
Male 0.171 0.209 0.102 0.063 0.029 0.026 
 [0.031]** [0.026]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.012]* [0.012]* 
White -0.225 -0.060 -0.025 0.003 0.036 0.064 
 [0.026]** [0.028]* [0.022] [0.025] [0.015]* [0.017]** 
Realtax 0.121      
 [0.810]      
Realprice  0.448 -0.119 0.036 -0.014 0.027 
  [0.501] [0.194] [0.238] [0.107] [0.049] 
Income   -0.000 -0.074 -0.054 -0.040 
   [0.015] [0.017]** [0.010]** [0.009]** 
Index   -0.160 -0.001 0.069 -0.026 
   [0.035]** [0.050] [0.042] [0.038] 
Constant 1.105 -0.115 0.430 -0.036 0.229 0.083 
 [0.105]** [0.477] [0.186]* [0.251] [0.142] [0.119] 
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 Table 2-3-4 (continued) 
Price 
elasticity 
0.04 0.92 -0.28 0.10 -0.07 0.23 
Income 
elasticity 
  -0 -0.22** -0.23** -0.35** 
Observations 3160 2869 5843 4287 5796 4703 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2-4-1: Smoking Level (OLS Model with State Fixed Effects) 
Smoking level regressions with state fixed effects  
 1940s-1950s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Age -0.1 0.93 0.73 0.45 0.71 
  [0.12] [0.13]** [0.14]** [0.10]** [0.10]** 
Age square 0.12 -1.02 -0.75 -0.41 -0.62 
  [0.11] [0.14]** [0.16]** [0.11]** [0.12]** 
Less high 1.67 0.72 1.35 0.34 3.49 
  [0.71]* [0.99] [1.52] [2.02] [2.36] 
Highdrop 0.05 0.98 0.15 1.5 2.64 
  [0.75] [0.98] [0.95] [0.72]* [1.32]+ 
Some college -0.1 -1.17 -1.09 -0.18 -0.93 
  [0.80] [0.96] [0.95] [0.66] [0.62] 
College 0.41 -1.03 -2.97 -2.12 -3.32 
  [0.66] [1.47] [0.90]** [0.75]** [0.83]** 
Male 3.94 2.87 2.77 1.6 3.27 
  [0.54]** [0.61]** [0.71]** [0.57]** [0.54]** 
White  -3.37 5.15 7.06 4.24 4.4 
  [0.75]** [1.07]** [0.82]** [0.78]** [0.86]** 
Realtax -3.96      
  [53.35]      
Realprice   12.52 -1.86 -1.53 -3.21 
    [9.16] [13.04] [4.61] [2.72] 
Income   0.01 0.18 -0.11 -1.35 
    [0.91] [0.75] [0.45] [0.48]** 
Constant 15.35 -14.7 -6.09 3.83 2.22 
  [14.39] [7.92]+ [13.67] [5.33] [6.27] 
price 
elasticity -0.04 0.61 -0.09 -0.12 -0.42 
income 
elasticity   0 0.01 -0.01 -0.09** 
Observations 1397 1131 1349 1476 1101 
R-squared 0.1 0.17 0.13 0.1 0.21 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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 Table 2-4-2: Smoking Level (OLS Model with Clean Indoor Air Index) 
Smoking level: OLS model with year dummies and clean indoor air index 
 1940s-1950
s 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Age -0.11 0.91 0.75 0.44 0.72 
 [0.11] [0.11]** [0.14]** [0.10]** [0.09]** 
age22 0.14 -1.00 -0.77 -0.40 -0.63 
 [0.11] [0.13]** [0.15]** [0.11]** [0.11]** 
Lesshigh 1.52 0.59 1.36 -0.14 3.43 
 [0.65]* [0.98] [1.44] [1.95] [2.11] 
highdrop 0.12 0.93 0.20 1.51 2.29 
 [0.76] [0.94] [0.91] [0.71]* [1.27]+ 
Somecol -0.50 -1.15 -0.69 -0.27 -1.12 
 [0.75] [0.93] [0.90] [0.62] [0.57]+ 
College 0.38 -1.34 -2.81 -2.37 -3.33 
 [0.61] [1.41] [0.87]** [0.76]** [0.77]** 
Male 3.94 3.05 2.66 1.60 3.19 
 [0.49]** [0.59]** [0.68]** [0.57]** [0.55]** 
White -3.59 5.02 7.18 4.17 4.41 
 [0.81]** [0.97]** [0.74]** [0.79]** [0.82]** 
Rrealtax 5.24     
 [4.94]     
Rrcprice  4.44 -12.42 -3.60 -2.56 
  [2.81] [4.12]** [1.75]* [0.97]* 
income_hh  0.17 0.01 -0.04 -1.45 
  [0.82] [0.71] [0.42] [0.47]** 
Index  -3.11 0.31 -1.57 -1.16 
  [1.22]* [1.06] [0.66]* [1.06] 
Constant 19.63 -5.77 6.80 7.75 0.99 
 [2.65]** [3.13]+ [5.00] [3.60]* [2.70] 
Price 
elasticity 
 0.22 -0.6** -0.28* -0.34* 
Income 
elasticity 
 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.10** 
Observations 1397 1131 1349 1476 1101 
R-squared 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.16 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2-4-3: Smoking Level (OLS Model) 
Smoking level: w/o wasserman index and w/o state fixed effects 
 1940s-1950s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Age -0.11 0.91 0.75 0.44 0.72 
 [0.11] [0.11]** [0.14]** [0.10]** [0.09]** 
Age square 0.14 -1.00 -0.77 -0.40 -0.63 
 [0.11] [0.13]** [0.15]** [0.11]** [0.11]** 
Lesshigh 1.52 0.68 1.37 -0.07 3.40 
 [0.65]* [0.97] [1.44] [1.94] [2.13] 
Highdrop 0.12 0.97 0.20 1.51 2.28 
 [0.76] [0.94] [0.90] [0.72]* [1.28]+ 
Somecol -0.50 -1.18 -0.68 -0.23 -1.16 
 [0.75] [0.91] [0.90] [0.63] [0.56]* 
College 0.38 -1.27 -2.80 -2.39 -3.32 
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 [0.61] [1.41] [0.88]** [0.76]** [0.77]** 
Male 3.94 2.99 2.66 1.56 3.17 
 [0.49]** [0.60]** [0.68]** [0.57]** [0.56]** 
White -3.59 5.15 7.19 4.17 4.40 
 [0.81]** [0.94]** [0.75]** [0.79]** [0.80]** 
Realtax 5.24     
 [4.94]     
Realprice  2.81 -11.96 -5.40 -3.08 
  [2.94] [3.68]** [1.66]** [0.84]** 
Income  0.26 0.01 -0.06 -1.46 
  [0.81] [0.71] [0.42] [0.48]** 
Constant 19.63 -5.30 6.51 9.73 1.25 
 [2.65]** [3.16] [4.86] [3.60]** [2.50] 
Price 
elasticity 
0.23 0.14 -0.66** -0.46** -0.34** 
Income 
elasticity  
 0.01 0 -0.004 -0.08** 
Observations 1397 1131 1349 1476 1101 
R-squared 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.16 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2-4-4: Smoking Level (OLS Model with State Fixed Effects and Clean Indoor 
Air Index) 
Smoking level: w/ state fixed effects and w/ wasserman index 
 1940s-1950s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Age -0.10 0.93 0.73 0.45 0.70 
 [0.12] [0.13]** [0.14]** [0.10]** [0.10]** 
Age square 0.12 -1.02 -0.75 -0.41 -0.61 
 [0.11] [0.14]** [0.16]** [0.11]** [0.12]** 
Lesshigh 1.67 0.72 1.35 0.35 3.48 
 [0.71]* [1.00] [1.52] [2.02] [2.36] 
Highdrop 0.05 0.96 0.15 1.50 2.62 
 [0.75] [0.99] [0.95] [0.72]* [1.32]+ 
Somecol -0.10 -1.12 -1.09 -0.18 -0.92 
 [0.80] [0.98] [0.95] [0.66] [0.62] 
College 0.41 -1.13 -2.97 -2.12 -3.31 
 [0.66] [1.50] [0.91]** [0.75]** [0.82]** 
Male 3.94 2.89 2.77 1.60 3.26 
 [0.54]** [0.62]** [0.71]** [0.57]** [0.54]** 
White -3.37 5.10 7.06 4.24 4.43 
 [0.75]** [1.07]** [0.82]** [0.79]** [0.86]** 
Realtax -3.96     
 [53.35]     
Realprice  12.19 -1.86 -1.43 -3.36 
  [8.18] [13.04] [4.69] [2.78] 
Income  -0.03 0.18 -0.12 -1.35 
  [0.91] [0.75] [0.45] [0.48]** 
Index  -3.35 -0.00 0.52 -2.15 
  [1.66]+ [2.82] [1.23] [2.29] 
Constant 16.88 -13.75 -6.09 2.29 3.55 
 [6.20]* [7.75]+ [13.66] [8.02] [6.31] 
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Price 
elasticity 
-0.17 0.61 -0.1 -0.12 -0.37 
Income 
elasticity  
 -0.001 0.01 -0.01 -0.07** 
Observations 1397 1131 1349 1476 1101 
R-squared 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.21 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The results show that there have been dramatic changes in the relationships 
between smoking determinants and cigarette demand from the 1940s to the 2000s. The 
relationships are very consistent across different specifications except the influence of 
cigarette prices.   
Males were more likely to smoke than women in each decade from the 1940s 
to the 2000s.  The gender difference in smoking participation is statistically 
significant in each decade.  However, the magnitude of gender difference in smoking 
participation has been decreasing over time: the gender difference in smoking 
participation was 17 percentage points in 1940s, 21 percentage points in 1950s, 0.1 
percentage points in 1970s, 0.06 percentage points in 1980s, and 0.03 percentage 
points in 1990s and 2000s.  In terms of conditional demand, male smokers smoke 
two to four more cigarettes per day than female smokers in each decade from the 
1940s to the 2000s. 
Whites were less likely to smoke in the 1940s and the 1950s; however, the 
black-white difference has been reversed – whites were more likely to smoke in recent 
decades, the 1990s and 2000s.  White smokers smoked about three fewer (about 20 
percent fewer) cigarettes per day in the 1940s and 1950s, but smoked from four to 
seven more cigarettes per day than non-white smokers in the later decades.  The 
results for gender and race generally confirm and extend the findings of Fiore et al. 
(1989) for the years 1974-1985.   
In addition, the results show that the relationship between schooling and the 
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 demand for cigarettes also changes from the 1940s to the 2000s.  In the 1940s, the 
associations between schooling and cigarette demand are small and usually 
statistically insignificant.  The only marginally statistically significant differences are 
that people with less than a high school education were less likely to smoke, but 
conditional on smoking, smoked more cigarettes per day.  However, in the 1950s, 
people with four-year college degrees were less likely to smoke than those who with 
high school degrees, but the difference is only marginally significant.  A gradient 
between smoking participation and schooling begins to emerge in the 1950s and 
strengthens in the following decades.  In the 1970s, people with four- year college 
degrees were statistically less likely to smoke.  In each decade after 1980, compared 
to people with high school degrees, those who with college degrees whether a 
four-year or two-year college were less likely to smoke.  By the 2000s, college 
graduates are 15 percentage points less likely to smoke than high school graduates, 
while high school drop outs are 13 percentage points more likely to smoke than high 
school graduates.  These trends are consistent with Kenkel and Liu (2008).  
Consistent with a causal role for schooling through health information, Kenkel and Liu 
find that the schooling-smoking gradient emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in tandem 
with a schooling-health knowledge gradient.  However, the persistence and growth of 
the schooling-smoking gradient over the latter part of the 20th century points to other, 
possibly non-causal, roles for schooling.   
Because of data limitations we are only able to examine the influence of 
income on cigarette demand from 1970s onward.  The results present changes in the 
associations between annual household income and smoking demand over time.  In 
the 1970s, there was no statistically significant association between income and 
cigarette demand.  However, later on, in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, household 
income was negatively and statistically significantly associated with smoking 
64 
 participation.  The estimated coefficients imply that the income elasticity of smoking 
participation have been changed from the 1970s to the 2000s.  We found that a 
1-percent increase in household income is associated with a decrease in the probability 
of smoking, by 0.20 percent in the 1980s, 0.21 percent in the 1990s, and 0.17 percent 
in the 2000s.  In the 2000s, the income elasticity of conditional demand for cigarettes 
is also negative and statistically significant.  Our results are fairly similar to 
Wasserman et al. (1991), who estimates that the income elasticity of cigarette demand 
changed from +0.051 in 1970 to -0.023 in 1985.  
Overall, the results indicate that there have been dramatic changes in smokers’ 
characteristics over time – in early decades, smokers tended to be male and non-white, 
with no significant difference in socioeconomic status between smokers and 
non-smokers.  In later decades, however, the gender gap has been shrinking, from 17 
percentage points in 1940s to the 3 percentage points in the 2000s; the black-white 
difference reverses; and smokers tend to be those with fewer financial resources and 
less education than non-smokers.  
Regarding the influence of cigarette prices on cigarette demand, the results are 
sensitive to different model specifications.  In Table 2-3-3, the model without state 
fixed effects and clean indoor air regulations, the signs of the coefficient on cigarette 
prices change from negative in the 1950s to positive in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 
then to negative in the 2000s.  In Table 2-3-2, the model includes the state level clean 
indoor air regulations, and the pattern of coefficients on cigarette prices is similar to 
that in Table 2-3-3, except that the relationship of cigarette prices reaches statistical 
significance in the 2000s.  Table 2-3-1 and Table 2-3-4 include state fixed effects and 
both fixed effects and clean indoor air regulations, respectively.  The coefficients on 
cigarette prices are very sensitive to state fixed effects.  Once we include the state 
fixed effects, the pattern of the relationships between cigarette prices and smoking 
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 participation changed.  The signs of the estimated coefficients and, hence, the 
implied price elasticities, vary from positive to negative across different decades.   
The results do not present any statistically significant associations between cigarette 
price and smoking demand in each decade.  In their meta-analysis, Gallet and List 
(2003) find that the mean of price elasticity estimates from 86 studies is -0.48, with a 
range from -3.12 to +1.41.  While our estimates are not outside this very wide range, 
they fall outside the narrower range of -0.3 to -0.5 described by Chaloupka and Warner 
(2000).  Several more recent estimates suggest that the Chaloupka-Warner range may 
have over-stated the price-elasticity of cigarette demand (Tauras 2005, Levy and 
Meara 2006, Colman and Remler 2008).  In the only previous study that uses 
individual-level data to estimate the demand for cigarettes over a long time period in 
the U.S., Wasserman et al. (1991) also find that “the price elasticity of demand is 
unstable over time, ranging from 0.06 in 1970 to -0.23 in 1985.”  In contrast, using 
state-level data from 1960-1990, Keeler et al.’s (2001) results imply that the price 
elasticity of demand is fairly stable over time at around -0.2 to -0.4.  
 
Regressions of Pooling Years 
The Cohort Effects: Pooling Years from 1944-2004 
 Table 2-5 presents results for a two-part model of cigarette demand using the 
pooled data from 1944 through 2004.  The pooled data allow us to explore trends 
over time and across birth cohorts.22  In addition to a general time trend, the results 
show strong birth cohort differences in smoking participation that vary by gender.  
The coefficients on the birth cohort indicators capture the cohort differences for 
women; the coefficients on the cohort*male interactions capture the cohort differences 
                                                 
22 Our approach in these models follows Wasserman et al. (1991).  As they point out, the results for 
age in these models must be interpreted carefully.   Because the models include year and birth cohort 
dummies, the models identify the effect of within-cohort age variation. 
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 for men.  Compared to men in the most recent birth cohort (born in the 1980s or 
later), men in the earlier birth cohorts are more likely to smoke.  For example, men 
born in the 1890s or 1900s are almost 20 percentage points more likely to smoke.  
With the exception of the oldest birth cohort (born in the 1880s or before), smoking 
participation among men falls fairly steadily with birth cohort.23   Male smokers in 
the earlier birth cohorts also report smoking more cigarettes per day.  In contrast, 
women in the earliest birth cohorts from the 1880s and 1890s are about 15 percentage 
points less likely to smoke, and report smoking fewer cigarettes per day conditional on 
smoking.  
 
Table 2-5: The Cohort Effects: Pooling Years from 1944-2004 
Pooling years 1944-2004 
 smoking participation Smoking level 
Age 0.004 0.353 
 [0.001]** [0.055]** 
Age square -0.009 -0.384 
 [0.001]** [0.056]** 
Lesshigh -0.007 1.322 
 [0.013] [0.435]** 
Highdrop 0.045 0.654 
 [0.010]** [0.347]+ 
Somecol -0.051 -0.547 
 [0.007]** [0.324]+ 
College -0.146 -2.303 
 [0.007]** [0.359]** 
White -0.004 3.561 
 [0.013] [0.524]** 
Realtax 0.018 -2.111 
 [0.009]+ [0.613]** 
Year -0.003 0.046 
 [0.001]** [0.046] 
                                                 
23 The result for the 1880s birth cohort might reflect differential mortality among smokers.  By the 
earliest Gallup Poll on smoking in 1944, members of this birth cohort were already at least 55 years old.  
More of the 1880s male birth cohort might have smoked but might not have survived to be interviewed 
in 1944 or later.  Differential mortality should play less of a role for the other birth cohorts, because 
most of the mortality differential between smokers and nonsmokers occurs after the age of 50 (Gilpin 
and Pierce 2002). 
67 
 Table 2-5 (continued) 
Index -0.026 -1.647 
 [0.011]* [0.466]** 
Cohort1880 -0.162 2.619 
 [0.096]+ [4.304] 
Cohort1890 -0.144 4.790 
 [0.094] [3.914] 
Cohort900 -0.074 3.711 
 [0.090] [3.344] 
Cohort1910 0.002 5.348 
 [0.081] [3.150]+ 
Cohort1920 0.008 5.418 
 [0.077] [2.728]+ 
Cohort1930 0.029 6.551 
 [0.063] [2.273]** 
Cohort1940 0.035 6.045 
 [0.058] [1.950]** 
Cohort1950 -0.003 4.961 
 [0.054] [1.660]** 
Cohort1960 0.002 3.799 
 [0.053] [1.438]* 
Cohort1970 0.005 1.507 
 [0.047] [1.333] 
male==1 0.007 2.476 
 [0.054] [1.329]+ 
Cohort1880*male 0.104 2.486 
 [0.058]+ [2.424] 
cohort1890*male 0.196 -0.468 
 [0.058]** [1.838] 
cohort1900*male 0.177 2.630 
 [0.061]** [1.603] 
Cohort1910*male 0.123 0.893 
 [0.062]+ [1.423] 
cohort1920*male 0.098 1.858 
 [0.057]+ [1.479] 
cohort1930*male 0.043 1.167 
 [0.056] [1.730] 
cohort1940*male 0.072 -0.044 
 [0.052] [1.403] 
cohort1950*male 0.054 0.212 
 [0.053] [1.570] 
cohort1960*male -0.015 -1.043 
 [0.057] [1.522] 
cohort1970*male 0.004 0.146 
 [0.058] [1.445] 
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Constant 6.502 -88.257 
 [2.225]** [90.929] 
Observations 26684 7026 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
The Influences of Economic Factors: Pooling Years from 1970 to 2004 
Table 2-6 presents the results for a two-part model of cigarette demand using 
the pooled data from 1970 to 2004.  We included the interactions of income and year, 
and cigarette prices and year in the regressions, which allows us capture the 
coefficients on income and price change over time.  Three specifications are 
estimated:  model with fixed effects and time trends, model with fixed effects and 
year dummies, and model with index for smoking restriction in public places and year 
dummies.  Table 2-6-1 presents the results for the smoking participation model, and 
Table 2-6-2 presents the results for the smoking level model.   
 
Table 2-6-1: Smoking Participation: Pooling Years from 1970 to 2004 
Smoking participation: pooling years from 1970 to 2004 
 Fixed effects & 
time trends 
Fixed effects and 
year dummies 
Index and year 
dummies 
Year -0.003239   
 [0.001551]*   
Age 0.010465 0.010440 0.010410 
 [0.000889]** [0.000914]** [0.000898]** 
Age square -0.015252 -0.015257 -0.015187 
 [0.000860]** [0.000886]** [0.000866]** 
Lesshigh 0.003547 0.002875 0.001289 
 [0.015336] [0.015334] [0.014781] 
Highdrop 0.067688 0.066742 0.067378 
 [0.011072]** [0.011103]** [0.011088]** 
Somecol -0.050679 -0.050278 -0.050414 
 [0.007132]** [0.007134]** [0.007136]** 
College -0.145732 -0.144917 -0.145247 
 [0.007932]** [0.008063]** [0.008069]** 
Male 0.053786 0.054228 0.054271 
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 [0.008079]** [0.008153]** [0.008098]** 
White 0.023576 0.024068 0.021434 
 [0.013151]+ [0.013257]+ [0.013431] 
Realprice -3.154633 5.392097 8.793370 
 [2.580572] [4.513241] [3.401336]* 
Year*price 0.001585 -0.002707 -0.004398 
 [0.001290] [0.002254] [0.001702]* 
Income 3.767346 3.881072 4.014538 
 [0.886419]** [0.890916]** [0.876437]** 
Yeal*income -0.001911 -0.001968 -0.002034 
 [0.000444]** [0.000447]** [0.000439]** 
Index -0.037628 -0.021656 -0.009384 
 [0.014426]* [0.014517] [0.013254] 
Constant 6.639274 0.212698 0.202717 
 [3.087917]* [0.048932]** [0.044032]** 
Observations 20629 20629 20629 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2-6-2: Smoking Level: Pooling Years from 1970 to 2004 
Smoking level: pooling years from 1970 to 2004 
 Fixed effects and 
time trends 
Fixed effects and 
year dummies 
Index and year 
dummies 
Year 0.007797   
 [0.002370]**   
Age 0.042073 0.043187 0.043115 
 [0.003756]** [0.003769]** [0.003745]** 
Age square -0.040633 -0.041997 -0.041954 
 [0.004197]** [0.004268]** [0.004223]** 
Lesshigh 0.006521 0.017608 0.020993 
 [0.040598] [0.039613] [0.039998] 
Highdrop 0.036115 0.040735 0.042707 
 [0.026151] [0.026494] [0.026410] 
Somecol -0.069786 -0.069838 -0.065161 
 [0.022363]** [0.023097]** [0.023038]** 
College -0.231985 -0.222981 -0.215958 
 [0.029495]** [0.029136]** [0.028581]** 
Male 0.155171 0.154518 0.152342 
 [0.019307]** [0.019740]** [0.019616]** 
White 0.360132 0.355259 0.353685 
 [0.028761]** [0.027719]** [0.026029]** 
Log(price) 6.639385 45.524784 40.512681 
 [7.610496] [15.077707]** [12.187859]**
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Year*log(price) -0.003535 -0.022952 -0.020450 
 [0.003810] [0.007561]** [0.006132]** 
Income 12.298494 11.916097 11.821545 
 [3.175275]** [2.905348]** [2.940047]** 
Year*income -0.006191 -0.006000 -0.005954 
 [0.001598]** [0.001463]** [0.001480]** 
Index -0.064866 -0.047361 -0.083291 
 [0.038683]+ [0.037491] [0.028164]** 
Constant -14.063863 1.429414 1.500721 
 [4.717127]** [0.112255]** [0.111231]** 
Observations 5032 5032 5032 
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.16 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
In Table 2-6-1, the coefficients on cigarette prices and the interaction of 
cigarette prices and year differ in different model specifications – the average cigarette 
price influence is negative but not statistically significant in the model with fixed 
effects and time trends; the influence is positive but not statistically significant in the 
model with fixed effects and year dummies; the influence is positive and reaches 
statistical significance in the model with clean indoor air regulation index and year 
dummies.  In addition, the interaction between cigarette prices and year differs in 
different model specifications – the interaction is positive but not statistically 
significant in the model with state fixed effects and time trends; the interaction is 
negative but not statistically significant in the model with fixed effects and year 
dummies; the interaction is negative and statistically significant in the model with 
clean indoor air index and year dummies.    
 In Table 2-6-2, the average cigarette price influence is positive and decreases 
over time.  The results are statistically significant in the model with state fixed effects 
and year dummies and the model with clean indoor air regulations and year dummies.   
Regarding the influence of income on cigarette demand, the results are much 
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 consistent across model specifications.  The average income influence is positive and 
decreases over time.  The results reach statistical significance in 1% significance 
level.  
We impute the year-basis price elasticity and income elasticity for smoking 
participation and smoking level using the results from Table 2-6-1 and 2-6-2 for the 
model with clean indoor air index and year dummies.  The results are presented in 
Table 2-7.  The signs of price elasticities for smoking participation and smoking level 
flip from positive to negative over time.  This is consistent with Wasserman (1988).  
There are some differences between our results and Wasserman (1988) – we found that 
price elasticity for smoking participation flips from positive to negative in 2000 and 
price elasticity for smoking level flips from positive to negative in 1981; Wasserman 
(1988) found that price elasticity flips from positive to negative much earlier – for 
smoking participation, price elasticity flips from positive to negative in 1976, and for 
smoking level, price elasticity flips from positive to negative in 1979.   
 
Table 2-7: Imputed Price Elasticity and Income Elasticity from Two Part Model 1970 - 
2004 
 Smoking participation Smoking level 
year 
Price 
elasticity 
Income 
elasticity 
Price  
elasticity 
Income  
elasticity 
1970 0.563 0.024 0.224 0.005
1971 0.544 0.017 0.203 0.005
1972 0.525 0.011 0.183 0.005
1973 0.506 0.004 0.162 0.004
1974 0.487 -0.003 0.142 0.004
1975 0.467 -0.010 0.121 0.004
1976 0.448 -0.017 0.101 0.003
1977 0.429 -0.023 0.080 0.003
1978 0.410 -0.030 0.060 0.003
1979 0.391 -0.037 0.039 0.002
1980 0.372 -0.044 0.019 0.002
1981 0.352 -0.051 -0.001 0.002
1982 0.333 -0.058 -0.022 0.001
1983 0.314 -0.064 -0.042 0.001
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1984 0.295 -0.071 -0.063 0.001
1985 0.276 -0.078 -0.083 0.000
1986 0.257 -0.085 -0.104 0.000
1987 0.237 -0.092 -0.124 -0.001
1988 0.218 -0.098 -0.145 -0.001
1989 0.199 -0.105 -0.165 -0.001
1990 0.180 -0.112 -0.185 -0.002
1991 0.161 -0.119 -0.206 -0.002
1992 0.142 -0.126 -0.226 -0.002
1993 0.122 -0.132 -0.247 -0.003
1994 0.103 -0.139 -0.267 -0.003
1995 0.084 -0.146 -0.288 -0.003
1996 0.065 -0.153 -0.308 -0.004
1997 0.046 -0.160 -0.329 -0.004
1998 0.027 -0.166 -0.349 -0.004
1999 0.007 -0.173 -0.370 -0.005
2000 -0.012 -0.180 -0.390 -0.005
2001 -0.031 -0.187 -0.410 -0.005
2002 -0.050 -0.194 -0.431 -0.006
2003 -0.069 -0.200 -0.451 -0.006
2004 -0.088 -0.207 -0.472 -0.006
 
Income elasticity also flips from positive to negative from 1970 to 2004.  We 
found that income elasticity for smoking participation flips from positive to negative 
in 1974.  The signs and magnitudes of income elasticity are consistent with 
Wasserman (1988).  We also found that income elasticity for smoking level flips 
from positive to negative in 1987 and since then the elasticity becomes more and more 
negative over time.  Since Wasserman (1988) only covers data through 1985, the 
income elasticity for smoking level in his model does not capture that the sign flips 
from positive to negative.   
 
Omitted Variable Bias in Price Elasticity 
The patterns in Table 2-8 suggest that the potential for omitted variable bias in 
estimates of the price-elasticity of cigarette demand might be increasing over the time 
period we study.  The models in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 allow the state fixed effects 
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 to vary by decade, so in principle they should control for the type of changing 
state-level influences suggested by the results of Table 2-8.  In practice, there is only 
limited within-state variation in taxes/prices per decade, especially in the earlier 
decades we study.  This means that with these data we may be unable to precisely 
estimate the effects of the cigarette prices separately from the state fixed effects.    
Because of this inherent data limitation, we do not view our results as being very 
informative about the price-elasticity of cigarette demand. 
 
Table 2-8: State Level Models of Cigarette Prices 
Dependent variables: state-level cigarette tax/price 
 1944 1949 1954 1957 1969 1971 1972 1977 
Tobacco 
states 
-0.02 0.05 -0.11 -0.11 -0.20 -0.28 -0.31 -0.25 
 [0.11] [0.07] [0.08] [0.07] [0.09]* [0.10]** [0.11]** [0.06]**
Anti 
smoking 
sentiment 
0.06 0.23 -0.15 -0.00 0.42 0.08 0.16 0.21 
 [0.27] [0.14] [0.19] [0.17] [0.22]+ [0.24] [0.25] [0.15] 
Constant 0.41 0.31 1.59 1.69 1.93 1.89 1.90 1.71 
 [0.05]** [0.03]** [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.05]** [0.05]** [0.03]**
Observations 31 43 49 49 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.26 0.19 0.22 0.37 
Standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 1981 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1994 1996 
Tobacco 
states 
-0.19 -0.24 -0.27 -0.29 -0.21 -0.21 -0.24 -0.27 
 [0.05]** [0.06]** [0.06]** [0.07]** [0.10]* [0.10]* [0.13]+ [0.15]+ 
Anti 
smoking 
sentiment 
0.17 0.31 0.31 0.37 0.76 0.71 0.74 0.86 
 [0.12] [0.14]* [0.15]* [0.17]* [0.23]** [0.24]** [0.32]* [0.35]* 
Constant 1.47 1.98 2.03 2.15 2.37 2.55 2.38 2.45 
 [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.05]** [0.05]** [0.06]** [0.07]**
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.35 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.37 0.34 0.25 0.27 
Standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Tobacco 
states 
-0.26 -0.26 -0.23 -0.24 -0.33 -0.43 -0.50 
 [0.15]+ [0.18] [0.19] [0.19] [0.25] [0.29] [0.32] 
Anti 
smoking 
sentiment 
1.07 1.41 1.49 1.39 1.62 1.62 1.58 
 [0.37]** [0.43]** [0.46]** [0.47]** [0.61]* [0.70]* [0.78]* 
Constant 2.56 3.53 3.73 3.87 4.17 4.29 4.24 
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 [0.07]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.09]** [0.12]** [0.14]** [0.16]** 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.30 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.20 
Standard errors in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Discussion 
Over the sixty-year time span covered in our data, smoking participation falls 
from almost 50 percent to 22 percent.  Although prices are the focus of many studies 
of cigarette demand, differences in cigarette prices over time do not explain all of the 
longer-run downward trend in smoking participation (see Figure 2).24   
 
 
Figure 2: Smoking Participation and Cigarette Prices, 1954-2004 
 
Our results show that it is important to recognize that the influences of 
economic and non-economic factors on cigarette demand change over time.  From 
                                                 
24 In a multiple regression estimated with the 21 data points in Figure 1, after controlling for a linear and 
quadratic time trend,  the coefficient on price is +0.03 (t=1.94). 
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 1944 to 2004 the economic factors (price and income) change from having no 
statistically significant effects to being negatively associated with cigarette smoking; 
the negative associations strengthen in magnitude over time.  The influences of 
non-economic factors (gender, race, and schooling) on cigarette demand also change 
over time.  From 1944 to 2004: the gender difference in smoking rates almost 
disappears; the black-white difference reverses; a strong gradient with schooling 
emerges; and the negative income elasticities strengthened in magnitude.  While the 
longer time period we study is not very informative about the role of cigarette prices, 
our results show that it is important to recognize that the influences of key 
demographic factors on cigarette demand change over time.  
   As discussed in special Surgeon General’s Reports, other social and behavioral 
sciences explore gender and racial differences in smoking (USDHHS 1998, 2001).  
The various and varying demographic influences on cigarette demand are potentially 
fruitful areas for future health economic research as well.  In particular, better 
understanding the schooling-smoking gradient, and the perhaps related negative 
income elasticity of cigarette demand, remain key challenges.   
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 CHAPTER 3: WTO ENTRY, A NEW CIGARETTE TAX SCHEME, AND THE 
TOBACCO MARKET IN TAIWAN 
 
Abstract 
This study analyzes the impacts of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO, which was 
accompanied by a series of policy changes on both the supply and demand sides of the 
tobacco market.  It investigates the link between cigarette tax and price by imputing 
the tax pass-through rates, and confirms the hypothesis that free trade induces an 
increase in advertisements and the introduction of new brands and products.  
Regarding smokers’ reactions to price changes, this study finds some evidence that 
smokers not only react to price changes, but also react to relative price changes by 
switching brands.  It also takes into account other scenarios accompanying the WTO 
entry that influence the brand choices.  One limitation of this study is that the small 
sample size and limited number of switchers in the data set hinders econometric 
analysis.  However, the descriptive statistics suggest an effect of relative price change 
that usually has been overlooked.  
 
Introduction 
Taiwan became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 
1st, 2002.  The goal of the WTO is to promote the benefits from free trade by 
encouraging the member nations to reduce tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.  In the 
tobacco market, trade liberalization means more competition in product prices, quality, 
and marketing, and consequently results in an increase in cigarette consumption.  
This study analyzes the impacts of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO in 2002 and the 
accompanying policy changes, on both the supply (cigarettes producers) and demand 
sides (cigarettes consumers) of the market.   
81 
 Taiwan’s entry into the WTO brought a dramatic change to its tobacco market.  
The changes were: (1) replacement of the tobacco monopoly profit tax by a new 
cigarettes tax scheme, (2) the transformation of the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine 
Monopoly Bureau (TTWMB), the exclusively government-run domestic cigarette 
supplier, into a corporation, and (3) the imposition of a NT$5 health and welfare 
surcharge on every cigarette pack.  After these changes cigarette prices increased by 
about NT$10 for both domestic and imported cigarettes25.  Since imported cigarettes 
had higher prices to begin with, this led to a change in the price of imported cigarettes 
relative to domestic cigarettes – the domestic cigarette prices typically increased by 
35% while the imported cigarette prices typically increased by 25%.     
This study analyzes the changes in cigarette prices after the policy changes.  
This first part of the study explores how much of the tax is passed through onto the 
price for each individual brand and product.  The next part of the study examines 
whether there is a difference in tax pass-through rates between domestic and imported 
cigarettes.  Lastly, the increased competition in product quality and marketing, and 
increases in cigarette advertisements are examined.  
 The changes in prices and marketing promotions are expected to influence 
cigarettes consumption.  This study analyzes the ways smokers react to these changes 
in terms of cigarette smoking and brand switching.  In addition, because the 
tax-induced cigarette prices change in both absolute and relative values, it is possible 
to disentanglement of the overall price effect into substitution and income effects.  
This study estimates whether or not smokers react to price increases by switching to 
lower price brands, and whether or not smokers react to relative price changes by 
switching to higher-priced brands with lower price increase rates.   
This study extends the previous research by focusing on the reactions of the 
                                                 
25 The yearly average NT dollar exchange rate was 33.8 against the US dollar in 2001.   
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 supply and demand sides of the tobacco market to a series of policy changes in 2002 in 
the following areas: (1) it establishes a relationship between the new cigarettes tax 
scheme and price-hike by analyzing the tax pass-through rates; (2) it analyzes the 
non-price competitions; and (3) it investigates the influence of cigarette price-hikes on 
brand switching behaviors.  Tsai et al. (2005) found that after the price-hike, smokers 
switched to lower-priced cigarettes.  This study, however, argues that smokers not 
only reacted to the absolute price increase, but also to the relative price increase. 
Moreover, this study also takes into account other scenarios that accompanied 
Taiwan’s entrance into the WTO and that are associated with brand choices   
  
Background of the Tobacco Market and New Cigarette Tax Scheme 
Prior to 1987, the tobacco market in Taiwan was a monopoly, with only one 
government-run legal supplier of cigarettes, called the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine 
Monopoly Bureau (TTWMB).  At that time, foreign cigarette makers were prohibited 
from exporting and marketing their products in Taiwan; the TTWMB had the 
exclusive right to import foreign cigarette brand and impose high tariffs and quota 
regulations.  In 1987, under the impact of trade sanctions under section 301 of the US 
Trade Act, the U.S. successfully negotiated a trade agreement with Taiwan and started 
to export cigarettes to Taiwan.  Thereafter, Taiwan allowed other foreign tobacco 
companies to export and market their own brands.  The market share for imported 
cigarettes steadily increased after 1987, where there was a less than 1% market share 
of imported cigarettes, to 20% in the late 1980s and 30% in the 1990s.  By 2000, the 
share had risen to 55%26.      
Prior to 2002, the Taiwanese government did not impose any taxes on cigarettes, 
but the monopoly profit was collected by the government.  The monopoly profit for 
                                                 
26 Data come from Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Statistical yearbook.  
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 domestic cigarettes was around NT$11 per pack in 200127.  The Taiwanese 
government imposed a NT$16.6 per pack monopoly profit tax on imported cigarettes.  
The monopoly profit tax was approximately 47% of the retail price (Hu, 1997).  
In 2002, Taiwan gained official membership into the WTO, which changed the 
fundamental characteristics of its tobacco market: TTWMB transformed from a 
government agency to a cooperation called Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Cooperation 
(TTLC), though  the Taiwanese government still owned 100% of the company stocks 
(the ultimate goal is to privatize TTLC and release its stocks to the public in 2009), 
and the monopoly profit imposed in both domestic and imported cigarettes had been 
replaced with a new cigarette tax scheme.  On January 1st, 2002, a new tax scheme 
was implemented which mandated that all cigarettes be subject to a cigarette tax of 
NT$11.8 per 20-piece pack, an additional NT$5 as a Health and Welfare Surcharge to 
help fund tobacco control and national health insurance, and a 5% sales revenue tax.  
On top of that, an additional 27% tariff was imposed on imported cigarettes.  The 
new cigarette tax scheme led to a cigarette tax hike.  From 2001 to 2002, the tax 
increase for domestic cigarettes ranged from NT$6.33 to NT$8.34 per pack, varying 
by brand and product, while the tax increase for the imported cigarettes ranged from 
NT$3.59 to NT$45.28 per pack, also varying between brands and products.  Table 
3-1 presents the ways cigarette taxes were calculated for both domestic and imported 
cigarettes before and after 2002.  The section of relationship between taxes and prices 
presents a detailed description of prices and taxes before and after implementation of 
the tax scheme, and addresses the relationship between taxes and prices as well.  
 
 
                                                 
27 From Tsai et al (2005b).  The monopoly profit for domestic cigarettes is calculated by the monopoly 
profit collected from cigarettes/ packs of cigarettes sold.  The monopoly profit is the total revenue 
minus the total cost.  
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 Table 3-1 Cigarette Tax Policy Before and After the New Tax Scheme in 2002 
  Before 2002  After 2002 
  Domestic Imported Domestic Imported 
  D1 I1 D2 I2 
A Production 
Cost/ 
Imported 
Cost 
A (D1) A(I1) A(D2) A(I2) 
B Tariffs NA  NA 27% 
     B(I2)=A(I2)*27% 
C Excise Tax   NA NA 
D Cigarette Tax NA NA NT$11.8 NT$11.8 
E Health and 
Welfare 
Surcharge 
NA NA NT$5 NT$5 
F Sales Tax   5% 5% 
    F(D2)= F(I2)= 
    (A(D2)+D)*5% (A(I2)+B(I2)+D)*5%
G Monopoly 
Profit 
NT$11 NT$16.6 NA NA 
  G(D1)= 
C+F 
G(I1)= 
B+C+F 
  
H Total Tax NT$11 NT$16.6 NT$16.8+F(D2) NT$16.8+B(I2)+F(I2)
Sources: Tsai (2005b) “The evaluation of the impact of the new tax scheme on tobacco 
market” report from National Health Research Institute, Taiwan.  
Note: the amount of monopoly profit per pack for domestic cigarettes is calculated by 
Shu and Hsieh (1999).   
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Figure 3: Cigarette Prices between Domestic and Imported Cigarettes 2001 and 2002 
 
The Economics of 2002 Policy Changes 
In 2002, the government-run bureau (TTWMB) was transformed into a 
government-run corporation (TTLC), with plans that it will become a privately owned 
company in 2009.  Although the objective functions for bureaucrats and corporations 
are different – the bureaucrats maximize the total budget of their bureau 
(Niskanen1968), while the corporations maximize their total profits, their common 
characteristics of the government-ownership may lead to similar ways of operations.  
It is important, though is difficult, to distinguish their objective functions in order to 
predict the ways they set up their prices and operate their businesses.  The following 
present several possibilities of the objective functions for TTWMB and TTLC.  
For example, if the budget size of the TTWMB was tied with the monopoly 
profits it brought, TTWMB would have performed like a profit maximizing firm.  
 
 However, if the budget size of TTWMB was also related to its success in public 
reputations, it would have set a higher price than the profit maximizing rate in order to 
reduce the smoking prevalence and improve the public health.  For example, the 
Taiwanese government has been aggressively control the tobacco use since the late 
1990s.  
If the TTLC, a government-owned corporation, operated like a profit 
maximizing industry, and targeted at having a successful stock offering in 2009, it 
would have had incentives to offer a lower price than the price offered by TTWMB.  
However, because the TTLC was still owned by the government, the political pressure 
might lead it still takes into account the public health issues.  For example, Taiwanese 
government imposed a NT$5 per pack health and welfare surcharge on cigarettes in 
2002 aimed at reducing smoking rates by increasing cigarette prices.  This explains 
the pressure faced by the government that it should keep the cigarette prices high in 
order to increase the public health of the nation.  Therefore, it is uncertain about the 
differences in objective functions of the TTWMB and TTLC.  The following 
provides the economic framework for a link between tax and price in a less 
competitive market.  In addition, the non-price competition in a less competitive 
market is also addressed in this section.  Finally, the economic logic supporting the 
reactions of consumers to the policy changes are discussed. 
Economic theory predicts that the tax pass-through rates are determined by the 
demand and supply conditions, and market competitiveness.  In the competitive 
industries with a constant marginal cost of production, taxes will be fully passed 
through to consumers.  In less competitive markets, theory predicts a number of 
possible outcomes.  Stern (1987) concluded a much broader range for tax 
pass-through rates by examining a set of possible market structures.  For example, 
Stern (1987) found that in oligopoly when demand curve is isoelastic, the tax pass 
87 
 through rate will be above 100 percent.  In addition, the tax pass through rates will be 
greater (lower) in monopolistic competition based on if the elasticity of demand is less 
(greater) than one.  Several empirical studies confirmed that in the less competitive 
market, the tax pass-through rates are above 1 and range from about one to two (Cook, 
1981; Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz, 2002; Barnett et al. 1995).  Kenkel (2005) 
focused on alcohol beverage prices in Alaska and observed higher pass-through rates 
in some brand categories (the pass-through rate for on premise wine and spirits ranges 
from about 3 to 4).  Delipalla and O’Donnell (1999) found that the tax pass-through 
varies from under-shifting to over-shifting in an imperfectly competitive market based 
on the incidence of ad valorem or specific taxes.   
Since the Taiwanese tobacco market is less competitive and the tax incidence is 
different between the domestic and imported cigarettes -- the domestic cigarette taxes 
are combinations of excise taxes and value-added taxes, while the imported cigarette 
taxes are comprised of an excise tax, value-added tax, and an ad valorem tax--this 
study expects an over-shift tax pass-through with higher tax pass-through rates in 
domestic as compared to imported cigarettes.   
In addition, the non-price competitions, reflected in the increasing expenditures 
on advertisements and the newly introduced products meant to stand out from rival 
products, are important in a less competitive market.  Therefore, this study expects 
that after entry into the WTO, there would be increases in cigarette advertisements and 
promotions in the tobacco market; moreover, the new brands and products would be 
introduced in ways to target different subgroups and expand its business scope.   
After the series of policy changes in 2002, the prices for domestic and imported 
cigarettes increased by about NT$10.  Although imported cigarettes had higher prices 
than domestic ones, the uneven price-increase rates allowed imported cigarettes to 
seem less expensive.  This study focuses on brand switching behaviors in response to 
88 
 the price changes.   
Economic model predicts that when the price of a product changes, there are two 
effects on consumers.  First is the change in price of a product relative to other 
products, referred to as a “substitution effect”.  Second is the income change due to 
the price change, referred to as an “income effect”.  Tsai et al. (2005) concluded that 
after the price-hike, smokers who used to purchase expensive cigarette brands were 
more likely to switch, and they switched to lower-priced cigarettes.  However, Tsai et 
al. only capture the income effect, and overlook the “substitution effect”.  This study 
argues that some smokers might switch from lower-priced domestic cigarettes to 
higher-priced imported cigarettes, because imported cigarettes became less expensive 
than domestic ones after the price-hike.   
 
Data 
This study uses two data sources.  One is an individual level survey data, the 
Taiwan Cigarette Consumption Behaviors Survey (TCCBS), and the other is the 
cigarette prices data which provide the prices for each brand/product on the market in 
2001 and 2002, collected by Tsai (2005b).   
The TCCBS data is a longitudinal survey annually conducted from 2000 to 2003 
by the National Health Research Institutes (NHRI) in Taiwan.  The data set provides 
abundant information on cigarette smoking and consumption.  The cigarette smoking 
behaviors presented in the data set include current smoking status, smoking risk 
information, second-hand exposure, and attitudes toward smoking restrictions.  The 
cigarette consumption behaviors included in the data set are their top three cigarette 
brands consumed, the self-reported prices for each brand consumed, the reason behind 
choosing this brand, and the consumption behaviors related to smuggled cigarettes.  
Demographic characteristics and socioeconomic status are also included in the data 
89 
 set.   
In the initial year of survey, 3,824 non-institutionalized civilians aged 12-64 years 
old were interviewed.  The number of respondents dropped considerably from the 
initial survey to the second-year survey – around 20% of respondents dropped out 
between the first and second round.  After the second round panel was conducted in 
2001, the dropout rates in subsequent years were substantially lower.  This study 
mainly uses two year waves, 2001 and 2002, which cover before and after the policy 
change.    
This study restricts the respondents to those who consistently participated in each 
wave of survey.  This criterion provides 2,610 respondents with 518 respondents who 
smoked both in 2001 and 2002.    
The information on cigarette prices comes from Tsai (2005b), a research report of 
the NHRI in Taiwan.  It collected cigarette prices for each cigarette brand and 
product from 7-eleven convenience stores.  In the report, it listed out cigarette prices 
for each brand and product on the market in 2001 and 2002.   
 
The Relationship between Taxes and Prices 
The cigarette tax hike in 2002 induced by the new tax scheme was substantial 
when compared to the recent history of cigarette taxes.  For example, from 1987, the 
year when the market opened to foreign brand cigarettes, until 2002, the monopoly 
profit tax imposed on the foreign cigarette brands had been NT$16.8 and was not 
increased to adjust for inflation.  After 2002, the new tax scheme was imposed which 
led to a cigarette tax hike, and cigarette prices increased accordingly by about NT$10.   
In this section, I provide a detailed description of the cigarette tax increase and 
price increase after the new tax scheme was implemented.  Additionally, I estimate 
the relationship between cigarette taxes and prices across different brands and 
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 products by imputing the tax pass-through rates.  
Table 3-2 presents for each brand/product its price and tax in 2001 and 2002, 
price and tax differences from 2001 to 2002, and tax pass-through rates.  The first 
three columns present the names of tobacco companies, brands, and products, 
respectively, followed by prices in 2001 and 2002, price differences between 2001 and 
2002, taxes in 2001 and 2002, tax differences between 2001 and 2002, and tax 
pass-through rates.  Prices in 2001 and 2002 are collected by Tsai (2005b); tax for 
domestic cigarettes in 2001 refers to the tobacco monopoly profit NT$11(Tsai, 2005b), 
calculated by the total amount of tobacco monopoly profit divided by number of 
cigarette packs sold; tax for imported cigarettes in 2001 refers to the monopoly profit 
tax NT$16.6 per pack; tax in 2002 for domestic and imported cigarettes are imputed 
based on the tax policy presented in Table 3-1.  
 
Table 3-2 Cigarette Prices and Taxes across Brands before and after 2002 
Price increase across brands before and after 2002 
Brand Product 
price 
01 
price 
02 
price 
diff 
Tax 
01 
tax  
02 
tax 
diff 
tax 
pass- 
through
Domestic Cigarette 
Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Cooperation 
Long Life Yellow soft 25 35 10 11 17.33 6.33 1.58
  Yellow hard 25 35 10 11 17.33 6.33 1.58
  Yellow hard light 30 40 10 11 17.58 6.58 1.52
  White Soft light 25 35 10 11 17.33 6.33 1.58
  White hard light 30 40 10 11 18.34 7.34 1.36
  
White thin long 
light 30 40 10 11 18.34 7.34 1.36
  English light 25 35 10 11 18.09 7.09 1.41
  
Gentel round 
light 35 45 10 11 18.59 7.59 1.32
  Gentel hard light 30 40 10 11 18.34 7.34 1.36
  
Gentel hard very 
light 30 40 10 11 18.34 7.34 1.36
Sinox 100 light 50     11 19.34 8.34   
YES light 40 45 5 11 18.84 7.84 0.64
Fame Lights light 28 35 7 11 18.24 7.24 0.97
Net @live hard pack light 35 40 5 11 18.59 7.59 0.66
Passion   40 50 10 11 18.84 7.84 1.28
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 Table 3-2 (continued) 
Precious   30 40 10 11 18.34 7.34 1.36
Precious Light 35 40 5 11 18.59 7.59 0.66
New Paradise   15 30 15 11 17.59 6.59 2.28
New Paradise light 25 35 10 11 18.09 7.09 1.41
White Cloud   30 35 5 11 18.34 7.34 0.68
Gold Dragon hard pack 30     11 18.34 7.34   
President   26     11 18.14 7.14   
Victory   22     11 17.94 6.94   
Pease light 30     11 18.34 7.34   
Handsome light 30     11 18.34 7.34   
Imported Cigarette 
Japan Tobacco International 
Mild Seven Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Mild Seven Charcoal Filter 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Mild Seven 
Slim Lights 
Menthol 45 55 10 16.6 26.86 10.26 0.97
Mild Seven International 60 65 5 16.6 31.86 15.26 0.33
Mi-Ne Prestige 80 80 0 16.6 38.53 21.93 0.00
Mi-Ne Classic 60 65 5 16.6 31.86 15.26 0.33
YSL Menthol 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
YSL Filter   60           
YSL Menthol lights   60           
YSL Filter lights   60           
Peace Filter 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
Peace Lights   60           
Salem SlimLights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Salem 
Slim Lights 
Menthol               
Salem classic 45 55 10 16.6 26.86 10.26 0.97
Camel     50           
Imperial Tobacco Limited 
Davidoff Lights 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
Davidoff Classic 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
Davidoff Lights(Slims) 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
Davidoff Ultra 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
Davidoff Mild 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
Davidoff Supreme 30 40 10 16.6 21.86 5.26 1.90
Davidoff Magnum 150 200 50 16.6 61.88 45.28 1.10
Davidoff Magnum 150 200 50 16.6 61.88 45.28 1.10
Boss International 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Boss Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
West Lights 40 40 0 16.6 25.19 8.59 0.00
West classic 40 40 0 16.6 25.19 8.59 0.00
Regal     100           
Philips Morris International 
Marlboro Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Marlboro Menthol Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
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 Table 3-2 (continued) 
Marlboro Classic 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Parliament Lights 45 55 10 16.6 26.86 10.26 0.97
Parliament Classic 45 55 10 16.6 26.86 10.26 0.97
Parliament Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Virginia Lights Slims 45 55 10 16.6 26.86 10.26 0.97
L&M Milds 25 35 10 16.6 20.19 3.59 2.78
Saratoga     65           
British American Tobacco 
555 Ultra 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
555 Blue 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
555 Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
555 State Express 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Dunhill Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Dunhill Ultra Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Dunhill Ultimate Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Craven "A" Lights 30 40 10 16.6 21.86 5.26 1.90
Kent   45 55 10 16.6 26.86 10.26 0.97
Cartier Infinite Lights 55 65 10 16.6 30.20 13.60 0.74
Cartier Lights 55 65 10 16.6 30.20 13.60 0.74
Cartier Ultra Lights 55 65 10 16.6 30.20 13.60 0.74
Gallaher Limited 
Sobranie Classic 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Sobranie Classic Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Sobranie Mints 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
Sobranie Pinks 50 60 10 16.6 28.53 11.93 0.84
Sobranie Cocktail   170           
Nat Sherman, Inc. 
Nat Sherman   100 120 20 16.6 45.20 28.60 0.70
Sampoern 
Duport Classic 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
Duport Lights 40 50 10 16.6 25.19 8.59 1.16
VonEicken Group 
Springwater     90           
 
Table 3-2 indicates that after the new tax scheme was implemented, the tax 
increase for domestic brands ranged between [NT$6.33, NT$8.34], while for the 
imported brands, tax increases fell in the range of [NT$3.59, NT$45.28], varying by 
brands and products. The cigarette prices increased accordingly.  The price increases 
for domestic and imported cigarettes fell in the range of [NT$5, NT$15] and [NT$0, 
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 NT$50], respectively, with a NT$10 increase for most of the brands28.  Hence, in 
comparing the tax and price increase for each brand, the results indicate that taxes are 
over-shifted for some brands and under-shifted to prices for others.   
 This study further calculates the tax pass-through rates listed in the last column of 
Table 3-2.  The tax pass-through rates are calculated by dividing the price changes by 
the amount of tax increases for each brand and product.  Overall, the tax pass-through 
rate ranges from 0 to 2.78, with a median 1.16.  This implies the tax pass-through 
rates fall in a broad possibility from 0 to 2.78 - it ranges from an extreme case that the 
tax does not pass through to price at all, to another extreme case in which the tax is 
over-shifted to price by 278%.  On average, the tax pass-through rate is 1.16, 
implying that taxes are over-shifted to prices – 100% increase in tax is associated with 
a 116% increase in price.   
The tax incidences are different between domestic and imported cigarettes.  The 
domestic cigarette taxes are combinations of excise taxes and value-added taxes, while 
the imported cigarette taxes are comprised of an excise tax, value-added tax, and ad 
valorem tax.  Therefore, I divide the sample into two groups, and compare the tax 
pass-through rates between domestic and imported cigarettes.  For domestic 
cigarettes, the tax pass-through rate ranges from 0.64 to 2.28, with a median 1.36.  
For imported cigarettes, the tax pass-through rate ranges from 0 to 2.78 with a median 
0.97.  Although for both domestic and imported cigarettes, tax pass-through rates are 
bouncing above and below 1, the median tax pass-through rate is over 1 for domestic 
and under 1 for imported cigarettes.  The finding is consistent with previous 
empirical studies about the tax pass-through rates varying by different tax incidences.  
They found the over-shifting of the specific tax and under-shifting of the ad valorem 
                                                 
28 Three products’ prices increase by NT$0, six products’ prices increase by NT$5, one product price 
increases by NT$7, one product price increases by NT$15, one product price increases by NT$20, and 
two products’ prices increase by NT$50.  
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 tax in a less competitive market (for example, Johnson (1978); Delipalla and 
O’Donnell (1999); Barzel (1976)).   
 
New Brands, Nicotine, and Advertisements before and after 2002 
 The structural change of the domestic cigarette supplier that accompanied 
Taiwan’s entry into the WTO brought competition into the tobacco market.  The 
increasing competition is reflected in several new introduced brands and products, and 
the increasing advertisement expenditures.   
From 2002 to 2004, domestic cigarette company added one new brand and eight 
new products, while foreign cigarette companies added seventeen new brands and 
thirty-nine new products (Tsai 2005b).  The new brands and products contain lower 
nicotine than the existing products in the market (Tsai 2005b).   
 Table 3-3 presents the magazine advertisement expenditures for each cigarette 
brand in 2001 and 2002.  Overall, the foreign tobacco companies spent much more 
on advertisements than did domestic tobacco company: in 2002 the advertisement 
expenditures on imported and domestic cigarettes are 90% and 10% of the total 
cigarette advertisements expenditures, respectively.  However, domestic cigarette 
company increased its expenditures in 2002: the expenditure was NT$8,972 in 2001 
and increased to NT$25,609 in 200229.  This was an increase of 285%.  For 
imported cigarettes, the expenditure on cigarette advertisements in magazines was 
NT$175,200 in 2001 and NT$228,256 in 200230, or an increase of 130%.   
 
 
                                                 
29 The tobacco advertisements were only allowed in magazines after 1997 in Taiwan.  
30 The expenditures presented in the paper are not adjusted for the consumer price index (CPI).  
Because the CPI index had decreased from 2001 to 2002, the adjusted 2002 advertisement expenditures 
would be higher than the value without being adjusted.  The 2001 is the base year with consumer price 
index (CPI) 100, and the CPI for 2002 is 99.80.     
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 Table 3-3 Cigarettes Magazine Advertisements 2001-2002 
unit: NT$1000 
  2001 2002 
domestic cigarettes 
Long Life 6,128 12,918 
Sinox 100 360  - 
YES  -  - 
Fame Lights  -  - 
Net @live 2,484  - 
Passion  - 7,926 
Precious  -  - 
New Paradise  - 4,765 
White Cloud  -  - 
Gold Dragon  -  - 
President  -  - 
Victory  -  - 
Pease  -  - 
Handsome  -  - 
domestic total 8,972 25,609 
domestic(%) 0.05 0.10 
Imported cigarettes 
Mild Seven 22,500 37,714 
Mi-Ne 12,682 17,767 
YSL 4,120  - 
Peace 3,810 3,565 
Salem 14,906 15,763 
Camel  -  - 
Davidoff 14,696 29,330 
Boss  -  - 
West 11,756 15,545 
Regal  -  - 
Marlboro 19,930 22,074 
Parliament  -  - 
Virginia  -  - 
L&M 8,100 4,410 
Saratoga  -  - 
555 10,175 4,818 
Dunhill 20,835 14,698 
Craven "A"  - 3,460 
Kent  -  - 
Cartier 5,940  - 
Sobranie 13,700 21,140 
Nat Sherman 750 810 
Duport 11,150 37,062 
Springwater 150 100 
imported total 175,200 228,256 
imported(%) 0.95 0.90 
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Sources: Tsai (2005b). The original data is from the Rainmaker XKM international 
corporation.  It collects all cigarettes advertisements from 152 magazines and 
calculates the expenditures for each brand based on the suggested cost for each 
magazine.  “–“ indicates there is no expenditure for the specific brand is collected.   
 
Impacts on Cigarettes Consumption 
This section analyzes the influences of the cigarette tax-induced -price-hike 
and relative price change on cigarette smoking and brand switching.  It compares the 
brand switching behaviors where there is no policy change with where there is a policy 
change.  In addition, it takes into account other scenarios such as the effect of 
increasing amount of advertisements and new brands and products after Taiwan’s entry 
into the WTO on cigarettes brand choices.   
 
Smoking Prevalence 
Table 3-4 presents the general smoking status between 2001 and 2002.  The 
sample has 2,610 respondents who appeared in both waves in 2001 and 2002.  In 
2001, 551 respondents were current smokers.  In 2002, the number reduced slightly 
to 547 current smokers.  Twenty-nine people initiate or relapse into smoking in 2002, 
and thirty-three quit smoking in 2002.  The results suggest that on balance, smoking 
prevalence stays about the same (21%) before and after the tax hike, though a few 
people cease smoking and others begin or relapse.  
 
Table 3-4: The Transition of Smoking Status in 2001 and 2002 
          
2002 
2001 
Smoke Not Smoke Total 
Smoke  518 33 551 
Not smoke 29 2030 2059 
Total 547 2063 2610 
 
Table 3-3 (continued) 
Total 184,172 253,865 
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 Brand-Switching Behaviors between 2001 and 2002 
Table 3-5 presents smokers’ brand choices in 2001 and 2002.  The table 
presents a relationship between the rows, the brand choice in 2001, against the 
columns, the brand choice in 2002.  This table includes 512 smokers who smoked 
both in 2001 and 2002.  In the table, the first column and row indicate the cigarette 
prices for each associated brand in 2001 and 2002, respectively.  The second column 
and row indicate the assigned mark for each associated brand.  The third column is 
the brand name.  The numbers in the cell in the table indicate the number of smokers 
who fit into each specific category.  Brand names are sorted by listing domestic 
brands first, followed by imported cigarette brands.  The domestic cigarette brands 
(Long Life, Precious, Precious (light), and New Paradise), are listed first, and followed 
by the imported cigarette brands (Boss, Mild Seven, 555, Davidoff, Marlbolo, 
Parliament, Mi-Ne, Virginia Slim Lights, L&M, Dunhill, Kent, and Salem).  
 The top three brands in 2001 and 2002 were Long Life, Mild Seven, and 
Davidoff.  In 2001, 233 out of 512 (46%) smoked Long Life, 117 out of 512 (23%) 
smoked Mild Seven, 78 out of 512 (15%) smoked Davidoff, and the rest of the 
smokers (16%) smoked other brands.  The market shares for cigarette brands are 
highly clustered in the three brands of Long Life, Mild Seven, and Davidoff.    
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 In the table, the diagonal cells indicate the number of smokers who continued 
smoking the same brands in 2001 and 2002, for each specific brand.  Overall, 383 out 
of 512 smokers (75%) stuck with the same brands, while 129 out of 512 smokers 
(25%) switched brands after the price-hike.  Among brand switchers (N=129), 68 
switched to lower-priced brands (53%), and 34 switched to higher-priced brands (26%) 
than they would have paid if they had stuck with their original brands.  Sixty-one 
(47%) brand switchers switched across domestic and imported cigarettes.  Overall, 
the results indicate that after the tax hike, about 25% smokers switched brands; among 
the brand switchers, over half of them switched to lower-priced cigarettes.  This 
provides convincing evidence to support the hypothesis that smokers switch to 
lower-priced cigarettes to avoid the cigarette price-hike.   
 Because the price-increase rate is higher in domestic cigarettes than imported 
ones after the tax hike, domestic cigarettes become less cheap relative to imported 
cigarettes after the tax scheme.  I further investigate whether or not smokers react to 
relative price changes.  I divide the sample into domestic and imported brand users in 
2001, and investigate whether or not domestic brand users switch to imported brands 
after the price-hike.   
Among the domestic cigarette smokers in 2001(N=251), 210(84%) stuck with the 
same brands while 41(16%) switched brands.  In addition, among those who 
switched brands (N=41), eight (20%) switched to lower-priced brands, and 27 (66%) 
switched to higher-priced brands, relative to what they would have paid if they had 
stuck with their original brands.  Twenty-six, almost all of the switchers who 
switched to the higher-priced cigarettes, chose imported cigarettes.  In contrast, 
among the imported cigarette smokers who switched brands (N=89), 60 (67%) 
switched to lower-priced cigarettes and 10 (11%) switched to higher-priced cigarettes.  
Among the 60 imported-brand users who switched to lower- priced brands, 32 (53%) 
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 chose domestic brands.  Thus, the fact that a large portion of domestic-brand users 
switched to higher- priced imported cigarettes, and a relatively small portion of 
imported-brand users switched to lower- priced domestic cigarette brands after the 
price-hike means that smokers react to relative price change.  
 
Brand-Switching Behaviors between 2000 and 2001 
 In order to ensure that the brand switching behaviors seen between 2001 and 
2002 are influenced by price hikes alone rather than any other factor, this section 
provides the brand switching behaviors from 2000 to 2001, where there is no change 
in cigarette prices.  If the brand switching behaviors from 2000 to 2001 capture every 
possible influence but price-hike, it can serve as the basis of comparison for the brand 
switching behaviors after the price-hike.  If the switching behaviors show similar 
patterns between time frames 2000-2001 and 2001-2002, it is unlikely that the 
price-hike explains the switching behaviors seen in 2001-2002.  If, on the contrary, 
the switching behaviors exhibit different patterns between the two time frames, it 
gives some confidence to the claim that the pattern of brand switching 2001-2002 is 
probably not random, and is influenced by the price-hike.  The brand choices in 2000 
and 2001 are presented in Table 3-6.  
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 The brand choices in 2000 and 2001 during which cigarette prices did not change 
are presented in Table 3-6.  The data refer to has 477 smokers who smoked both in 
2000 and 2001, after deleting the observations with missing values in brand choices.  
Overall, 131 out of 477 (27%) smokers switched brands.  The percentage of brand 
switchers is slightly higher than that after the price-hike.  Among the brand switchers 
(N=131), 51 (39%) switched to lower- priced cigarettes, and 65 (50%) switched to 
higher- priced cigarettes.  On the contrary, the results from the previous section 
indicate that over half of smokers switched to lower- priced cigarettes after the tax 
hike.  Therefore, the evidence suggests that consumers only switched to lower-priced 
cigarettes after a price-hike.   
In addition, I compare whether or not domestic-brand users switched to higher- 
priced imported cigarettes in 2000-2001 and 2001-2002.  In 2000-2001, among the 
domestic-brand users who switched brands (N=54), 45 (83%) switched to higher- 
priced cigarettes, and nine (17%) switched to lower-priced cigarettes.  In contrast to 
the result that almost all of the switchers switching to higher -priced cigarettes chose 
imported cigarettes (26 out of 27) after the price-hike, only 39 out of 45 switched to 
imported cigarettes in 2000-2001.  Moreover, I compare the whether or not 
imported-brand users switched to lower- priced domestic cigarettes in 2000-2001 and 
2001-2002.  Contrary to the results that 32 out of 60 (53%) switchers switching to 
low price cigarettes chose domestic cigarettes after the price-hike, in 2000-2001, 
before the tax hike, 25 out of 42 (60%) chose domestic cigarettes.  After the 
price-hike, domestic cigarettes became relatively less cheap, and imported cigarettes 
become relatively less expensive.  These provide some evidence that after a relative 
price change, the behaviors of switching to higher-priced imported cigarettes and 
lower- priced domestic cigarettes occur more often and less often, respectively.  
 
103 
 Other Scenarios Influence the Brand Choices 
Since the new brands/products and advertisements also influence smokers’ 
brand choices, in this section I take into account their influences on brand switching.  
In 2002, when Taiwan became a member of WTO, there were no new cigarette brands 
and products entering the market.  Therefore, smokers had the same set of brand 
options to choose from in 2001 and 2002.  It rules out the possibility that the new 
competition in 2002 that brought in new introduced brands/products influenced 
smokers’ brand choices.  In addition, although domestic cigarette companies 
aggressively advertised their products, this study finds that in 2001-2002, there were 
more domestic-brand users switching to higher priced brands chose the imported 
brands than in 2000-2001.     
   
Conclusion 
 This study analyzes the impacts of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO and the 
accompanying series of policy changes on both the supply and demand sides of the 
tobacco market.  It investigates the link between cigarette tax and price by imputing 
the tax pass-through rates.  This study also provides evidence that suggests that the 
tax pass-through rates depend on the incidence taxation.  The general pattern is 
consistent with previous findings.  In addition, this study investigates the non–price 
competitions, such as competitions in quality and marketing.  It confirms that free 
trade induces an increase in advertisements, and results in the introduction of more 
new brands and products into the market.   
This study also investigates the impacts of tax-induced cigarette prices on 
cigarette smoking and brand switching.  It seeks to distinguish the income from 
substitution effects due to price increases by providing evidence that smokers not only 
react to price-hikes, but to relative price changes as well.  In addition to the previous 
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 findings that, in general, smokers tend to switch to lower- priced cigarette brands after 
the price-hike, this study finds that quite a few lower- priced cigarette smokers 
switched to higher- priced cigarette brands with lower price-increase rates.  Moreover, 
this study takes into account the other scenarios accompanying Taiwan’s entrance into 
the WTO which may influence smokers’ brand choices.  For example, the increasing 
competition in the tobacco market reflected in several new introduced brands/products 
and the increasing expenditures on cigarettes advertisements have been ruled out.    
The limitation is that the small sample size and the limited number of switchers 
in the data set hinder further econometric analysis on brand switching.  In addition, 
because the data does not provide smokers’ level of smoking among their top three 
cigarette brands, this study does not know their relative strength of favor among the 
three different cigarette brands they consumed.  This study focuses on the first 
cigarette brands smokers provided.  However, the descriptive summaries provide 
some evidence to support the claim that smokers not only react to price-hikes, but to 
relative price changes as well.  It calls to attention the effect of relative price change 
that usually has been overlooked in other studies.  
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 Conclusion 
Healthy behaviors directly improve the overall public health of a nation while 
reducing the cost of health care systems. Public and private agencies have, accordingly, 
conducted interventions such as increasing taxes, providing health-risk knowledge, 
implementing restrictions, etc. as attempts to alter citizens’ unwanted behaviors and 
encourage their healthy behaviors.   
The first chapter investigates whether people respond to the new health-related 
knowledge.  It examines whether married couples respond to information about 
modern contraceptive practices in a way that is reflected in fertility decline during the 
period when Taiwan’s family planning programs were implemented. The results 
indicate that contraceptive knowledge significantly reduces fertility, whether fertility 
is measured as life-time fertility or the probability of giving birth.   
The results of the second chapter indicate that people in different socioeconomic 
subgroups respond differently to health-related knowledge and regulations.  It 
focused on health behaviors of smoking and found a dramatic change in smokers’ 
characteristics during decades of tobacco control efforts – in early decades, smokers 
tend to be male and non-white, with no significant difference in socioeconomic status 
between smokers and non-smokers.  However, in later decades, the gender gap in 
cigarette smoking has shrunk to 3 percentage points in 2000s; the black-white 
difference reverses; smokers tend to be less well-off and less educated than 
non-smokers.  
The third chapter investigates impacts of Taiwan’s entry into the WTO and the 
accompanying series of policy changes on both the supply and demand sides of the 
tobacco market.  This study provides evidence that suggests that the tax pass-through 
rates depend on the incidence taxation.  It confirms that free trade induces an increase 
in advertisements, and results in the introduction of more new brands and products 
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 into the market.  Regarding smokers’ reactions to price changes, this study finds 
some evidence that smokers not only react to price changes, but also react to relative 
price changes by switching brands.   
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